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ABSTRACT 
Government introduced the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act, No. 53 
of 2003 and the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Codes of Good Practice 
(‘the Codes’) in 2007 to address the economic inequalities in South Africa by 
incentivising companies to include black people in economic activities. These 
incentives relate to implementation of preferential procurement, which is meant to 
favour companies that are BEE-compliant.  
Based on the literature and government’s intention with BEE policies, an assumption 
developed that companies with greater BEE compliance, which is measured through 
a BEE scorecard as per the Codes, would perform better in terms of market share 
through their revenue and in terms of profits. The main objective of this study was to 
carry out an in-depth analysis of the relationship between BEE scores and revenue 
growth and profitability of JSE-listed companies. This was done to determine whether 
the efforts by government of incentivising companies to be more BEE compliant are 
effective.  
This study was conducted as a two-part model consisting of regression analysis and t-
test to determine whether there is a relationship between BEE scores and revenue and 
profitability. The regression analysis focused on the top 100 most black-empowered 
companies. The t-test was a comparison of two data sets, which consisted of 
companies in the top 100 most black-empowered companies and those that do no fall 
among the top 100 most black-empowered companies.  
The results showed that, at the time of this research, there were no significant 
relationships between BEE scores and revenue and profitability. The analysis of the 
research findings collectively demonstrated that for both the tests (regression and t-
test), the relationship between revenue and profitability could not be established. 
Hence, the results postulate that BEE compliance does not produce the desired results 
for the companies, which can be translated into better profitability and market share.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Black economic empowerment (BEE) commenced with the Black Management Forum 
(BMF) meeting in 1997, which resolved that government should be pressured to come 
up with a BEE policy (Chabano, Goldstein & Roberts 2006; Nattrass & Seekings 
2010:31; Tangri & Southall 2008:563). This eventually led to the setting up of the BEE 
Commission by government in 1998, and ultimately led to the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Amendment Act, No. 53 of 2003 being promulgated in 2003 
(Chabano et al. 2006:563; Nattrass & Seekings 2010:31; Tangri & Southall 2008:703). 
The Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act, No. 53 of 2003 (the ‘B-BBEE 
Act’) is not detailed and only provides a framework for regulation (Department of Trade 
and Industry [dti] 2003a). It provides the Minister of Trade and Industry with authority 
to issue Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Codes of Good Practice (‘the 
Codes’) on BEE in the Government Gazette (dti 2003a). The purpose of these Codes 
is to outline components and elements of BEE and to provide guidelines for the 
application of the BEE Scorecard (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa [IoDSA] 
2009). 
The main aim of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 is to ensure that the organs of state 
and public entities comply with the Codes when: 
• issuing licences, concessions or other authorisations; 
• developing and implementing a preferential procurement policy; 
• selling state-owned enterprises; 
• entering into partnerships with the private sector (dti 2003a). 
Although the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 is binding on public entities, there is no legal 
requirement for private companies to comply with BEE (dti 2003a). The questions that 
remain are how far this has assisted in empowering black people, and − more relevant 
to this study − whether the private companies that do not necessarily have to comply 
with the BEE legislation could possibly benefit from complying. 
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Companies have spent a significant amount of money in an attempt to be BEE-
compliant (Jack & Harris 2007). Jack and Harris (2007) explain that companies will 
lose competitive advantage that will affect their cash flow negatively in future. This 
study sought to investigate whether BEE-compliant companies had competitive 
advantage by measuring revenue growth and profitability of these companies for 2007 
to 2013. 
Ellis and Kelley (1992:386) define the outcomes of competitive advantage as sales 
(revenue), gross profit margins, and net profit margins. For this reason, this study 
focused on revenue and profitability to measure whether or not high BEE scores (see 
2.5) resulted in high revenue and high profitability in the period 2007-2013. 
1.2 BEE STATUS QUO IN JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE 
The BEE status quo, specifically at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is crucial 
to determine the inroads that BEE policies have made. According to Statistics South 
Africa (2012), during the 2011 census, black people represented 90.6% of the total 
population while white people represented 8.9% of the population. This has not 
changed significantly since the 1996 census, when black people represented 89.1% 
of the population and white people 10.9% (Statistics South Africa [Stats SA] 2005; 
Stats SA 2012). 
However, according to research done by Empowerdex, a leading company in the  
B-BBEE industry which, together with the Financial Mail, which publishes information 
on BEE every year, indicates that black people own only 1.6% of the JSE value in the 
market capitalisation (Ntingi & Hlatshwayo 2010). Empowerdex arrived at 1.6% 
because they only considered a portion of the ownership without taking into account 
any portion of shares that are financed through financial institutions (Ntingi & 
Hlatshwayo 2010). If a portion of the shares financed through financial institutions is 
ignored, this figure increases to 5.75% (Ntingi & Hlatshwayo 2010). The trade union 
Solidarity argues that, according to its own research, black people owned 23% of the 
JSE share value in 2008. This is an increase of only 5% from 1995 (Ntingi & 
Hlatshwayo 2010). 
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In addition, the JSE conducted its own research, which revealed that black people 
owned 17% of the top 100 companies in 2011 (Chandler 2011). Considering that the 
top 100 companies on the JSE represented 85% of the market capital (Chandler 2011), 
this figure would not change significantly if all the companies listed on the JSE were 
included. This information regarding the black ownership percentage of the JSE is in 
contradiction to research done by Empowerdex and Solidarity. 
In addition, Sartorius and Botha (2008:442) indicate that 60% of the JSE-listed 
companies had transferred at least 10% of their equity to BEE partners by 2008. If this 
was indeed the case, and the companies maintained the same momentum, ownership 
by black people should have been significantly higher in JSE-listed companies in 2012. 
Whichever research is correct, the ownership of the companies listed on the JSE by 
black people is extremely low considering that black people represent more than 90% 
of the population in South Africa (Stats SA 2005:16). 
1.3 PROGRESS MADE SINCE 1994 
Despite the slow pace of transformation of companies in terms of black ownership of 
companies, in 1993, New Africa Investments Limited became the first black-owned 
company on the JSE (Jack & Harris 2007). This was the birth of transformation in 
business and the economy of South Africa. 
Although some of the experts and authors disagree on a method of measuring black 
ownership on the JSE, mainly because of the dispute on what constitutes ‘ownership’ 
(Southall 2004:318), the consensus amongst them is that the percentage of black 
ownership was below 5% before 2001. Kantor (1998:70) believes the value of black-
controlled companies listed on the JSE to be 10% of the market value of the JSE at 
the end of 1997. 
The transformation of the JSE in terms of participation of black people seems to be a 
challenging one. This is evident in the ownership on the JSE by black people, which 
varied over the years. As Southall (2004:318) explains, black ownership increased to 
about 10% of the shares on the JSE between 1994 and 1997, but when the stock 
market crashed in 1997, all those gains were lost and black ownership dropped by 
between 1% to 3.8% (Southall 2004:318). Chabano et al. (2006:564) also agree, and 
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point out that after the Asian stock market crash in 1998, the JSE market capitalisation 
controlled by black people decreased from 9.6% in 1998 to 4.3% in 1999. Figures 
supplied by Tangri and Southall (2008:703) are slightly different, as they explain that 
the share ownership by black people decreased from 8% to 4% after the 1998 stock 
crisis. 
Southall (2004:318) explains that in 1999, the value of the BEE ventures went down 
by R17.6 billion from 1998. This was caused by the share price of most of the black 
companies falling by more than 50%, resulting in BEE deals significantly dropping at 
the time (Southall 2004:318). 
However, black people’s participation began to shape up again around 2001 to 2002. 
According to Empowerdex, black people owned 10% of the top 115 JSE-listed 
companies’ total share value (Southall 2004:318). According to Nattrass and Seekings 
(2010:33), black ownership continuously improved but surged significantly from 2003 
onwards. By the end of 2006, JSE black ownership transferred stood at between 6% 
and 10%. Sartorius and Botha (2008:438) also found that only 38 of the JSE-listed 
companies on the JSE were 25% black-owned, which suggests that progress had been 
very slow. 
Furthermore, Southall (2004:315) found the progress of black capitalism in post-
apartheid South Africa to be very slow. This view was supported by the former 
president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who admitted that black empowerment was 
moving at a snail’s pace (Southall 2004:323). Chabano et al. (2006:557) seem to agree 
with this view explaining that process had been slow. By 2004, only five out of the top 
100 companies were in black control (Chabano et al. 2006:557). 
Tangri and Southall (2008:703) are less optimistic about the progress made in black 
empowerment. They point out that government has done very little to deracialise white-
owned companies, while the majority of black South Africans remain marginalised from 
mainstream economy (Balkaran 2017:109). The reason might be that government is 
not decisive in implementing BEE. Tangri and Southall (2008:703) continue to argue 
that black people have in fact become poorer since 1994, despite the small elite of 
BEE beneficiaries, which include a small number of prominent, politically connected 
empowered black figures (Tangri & Southall 2008:701). 
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In a more optimistic finding, Patel and Graham (2012:200) found that 2007 was a peak 
year for BEE deals, which amounted to R96 billion. This was 71% higher than 2005 
and 2006 (Patel & Graham 2012:200). However, these gains slowed down in 2008 and 
2009 because of difficulty in raising finance due to strict credit markets (Patel & 
Graham 2012:200). 
1.4 BEE LEGISLATION AND POLICY 
When apartheid ended and a new democracy started in 1994, black people had 
political power for the first time but lacked economic power since white people had 
more wealth and resources. It is against this backdrop that the policy and regulation of 
BEE were formulated, especially the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 
No. 5 of 2000 (Department of Finance 2000). In essence, according to this Act, 
government has to favour companies that are BEE-compliant when procuring goods 
and services (Department of Finance 2000). 
According to Jack and Harris (2007), government was forced to intervene in BEE 
through legislation – although it was not their intention – because the market and 
private sectors failed to address black people’s participation in the economy (Jack & 
Harris 2007). Government intervention, amongst other things, started with the Liquid 
Fuels Charter the Mining Charter and the Department of Trade and Industries Strategy 
document, which led to the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 and the Codes being 
promulgated (Jack & Harris 2007). The B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, as part of this 
government intervention, is supported by the South African Constitution in that section 
217 of the Constitution (1996), which deals with procurement, states: 
(1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial, or local sphere of government, or any other 
institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system, which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that subsection 
from implementing a procurement policy providing for – 
(a) categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and 
(b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination. 
(3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in subsection 
(2) may be implemented. 
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Furthermore, section 9 states, “(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed 
in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair” 
(Republic of South Africa [RSA] 1996). 
1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to the B-BBEE strategy document, the South African economy is performing 
below its potential because of the inequalities in the distribution of and access to wealth 
and income in the country, although government has come up with policies, strategies 
and programmes to address these inequalities (dti 2003c). 
Even after government had introduced the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, and the Codes 
in 2007 to address the economic inequalities mentioned in section 1.3 above, the 
problems persist. Some companies still resist transformation because they do not see 
it as beneficial. Another problem may be that the law does not enforce BEE legislation 
on any company; therefore, BEE transformation remains an option to all companies. 
Since 1994, there has been an extremely slow transformation in the JSE-listed 
companies (Jack & Harris 2007). As Jack and Harris (2007) explain, the reason for the 
slow transformation could be firstly, that some companies believe that the concept is 
not applicable to them, since they do not supply any goods and services to 
government. Secondly, some companies believe BEE is reverse discrimination being 
unfairly forced upon them; hence, the resistance to change (Jack & Harris 2007). 
Lastly, companies see the need to transform but do so in bad faith as they attempt to 
score BEE points without changing the status quo by engineering BEE deals, which in 
substance does not change anything (Jack & Harris 2007). 
A review of the current literature on BEE indicated the following research problems: 
• Since the introduction of the Codes in 2007, the BEE score has been the key to 
the success of many companies as they strive to achieve a high score. As Jack 
and Harris (2007) explain, companies will lose recognition as a preferred 
supplier if they do not achieve a favourable BEE score, which in turn affects 
their cash flow negatively. Companies have been on the journey, although 
difficult, to position themselves as transformed companies not only to earn a 
competitive advantage, but also to build a good company reputation. The 
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problem is that there is limited research to support the idea that achieving a 
higher BEE score results in a competitive advantage in the form of higher 
revenue and higher profits.  
• Various studies have determined that there is a relationship between the level 
of the BEE score and shareholder value through market performance although 
these studies are in conflict in terms of it being a positive or negative relationship 
(Alessandri, Black & Jackson 2011:241; Mehta & Ward 2017; Strydom, 
Christison & Matias 2009:75; Van der Merwe & Ferreira 2014; Ward & Muller 
2010; Wolmarans & Sartorius 2009:189). The challenge is that market 
performance and share prices only measure external performance of the 
companies. The theoretical and empirical understanding of how BEE scores 
and the internal performance measure of companies relate is fairly limited. It is 
therefore important to bring into this internal financial performance measures 
such as revenue growth and profitability as they are not influenced by external 
market factors. 
• There is a view that the cost of implementing and maintaining a compliant BEE 
rating is significant and could be too high to the extent that it outweighs the 
benefits that come with BEE compliance (Ferreira & De Villiers 2011:36; Mehta 
& Ward 2017:85). The problem is that this view has not been tested by research.  
Considering the above challenges, it would then seem that research on the relationship 
between BEE scores and revenue growth and profitability of JSE-listed companies 
would make a significant contribution to the discipline of financial accounting and on 
the subject of BEE as a whole. The observed results would then be generalised to 
provide information to companies intending to improve their BEE scores and ultimately 
improve their revenue and profitability.  
Since inadequate research has been done on BEE, available in-depth research is 
relatively limited and has many shortcomings. This includes limited literature on BEE 
challenges and factors necessary for BEE to succeed (Krüger 2011:86). 
1.6 OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY 
The main objective of this study was to carry out an in-depth analysis of the relationship 
between BEE scores and revenue growth and profitability of JSE-listed companies. 
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The following hypotheses were formulated to be tested concerning the relationship 
between BEE scores and revenue growth and profitability of JSE-listed companies: 
→ Alternative hypothesis 
JSE-listed companies with high BEE scores benefit more by generating 
more revenue and profits than JSE-listed companies that are not BEE-
compliant. 
→ Second alternative hypothesis 
JSE-listed companies that are BEE-compliant and score high on the BEE 
scorecard have lower revenue growth and profitability. 
→ Null hypothesis 
BEE compliance and scoring high on the BEE scorecard has no 
significant effect on revenue and profitability of JSE-listed companies. 
In an attempt to achieve the objective of this study, certain objectives were set, namely 
to – 
• determine the extent to which companies benefit financially from complying with 
BEE policies; 
• determine whether there are any financial disadvantages for complying with 
BEE policies; 
• highlight opportunities for companies in terms of BEE compliance; 
• determine the extent to which BEE objectives, as outlined in the Strategy of 
Broad-based BEE (dti 2003c), are achieved; and 
• make recommendations on possible ways in which BEE compliance could be 
improved. 
Some companies still resist transformation because they do not perceive it as 
beneficial to their company. If the benefits of investing in BEE are not realised by these 
companies, this has the potential of discouraging companies to invest in BEE. This will 
be detrimental to the country as a whole, as the BEE objectives as discussed in 
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Chapter 2 (see 2.4), specifically those of growing the economy and getting the majority 
of the South African people to participate in economic activities may not be achieved. 
This study aimed to make recommendations on how these issues of BEE could be 
addressed to ensure that BEE is successful and achieves government-intended 
objectives. 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
According to Fauconnier and Mathur-Helm (2008:1), literature on the transformation in 
South Africa is limited with many gaps, and does not cover many factors. The current 
study sought to contribute to one of the gaps in literature, namely the relationship 
between BEE scores on the one hand and revenue and profitability on the other. This 
study also sought to address the knowledge gap existing in terms of BEE compliance 
by companies between investors, other stakeholders and companies listed on the JSE. 
Government has implemented BEE policies through the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 
and the Codes in an effort to encourage businesses in general to participate in 
transformation of the business environment by offering economic incentives to those 
who participate. The relevance of this study was to highlight the success or failure of 
these policies to assist business stakeholders in decision-making relating to BEE 
strategies. 
Sartorius and Botha (2008:439) identify a number of reasons why companies 
implement BEE initiatives. One of the main reasons is that companies seek to grow 
market share and their business in general (Sartorius & Botha, 2008:439). The current 
study sought to measure whether this is realised by the JSE-listed companies by 
investigating whether revenue growth, including its profitability, relates to the BEE 
scores. This will contribute to the knowledge base of the benefits of companies 
investing in BEE as a whole. 
1.8 METHODOLOGY 
This section explains the research methodology applied to construct a model to meet 
the research objective of this study. The research methodology was quantitative in 
nature. All data used was secondary. Data on BEE scores of the Top 100 most black-
  10
empowered companies was obtained from the Empowerdex website from their annual 
Financial Mail/Empowerdex top empowerment companies survey (Empowerdex 
2015). Empowerdex annually compiles the Top Empowerment Companies. The 
current study rank the top 100 JSE companies in terms of Broad-Based BEE scores. 
The Financial Mail publishes this information annually (Empowerdex 2015). 
Data relating to financial performance measures of all JSE-listed companies was 
obtained from the INET BFA (previously known as McGregor BFA) database. Other 
data collected was obtained from the literature review, legislation on BEE, previous 
research conducted on broad-based BEE and BEE in general, and existing empirical 
surveys and statistical data, all of which was used to reach conclusions in this study 
and to make recommendations. 
Existing empirical data was used to establish the current statistics including the level 
of BEE compliance in JSE-listed companies and other comparative data. This data 
was extracted from the latest statistics available from various documents and previous 
similar studies. 
In the first part of this study, the top 100 most black-empowered companies were 
ranked according for their BEE scores and analysed to test whether there is any 
relationship between the BEE scores and revenue growth and profitability. A 
hierarchical regression analysis processed and analysed through the IBM Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to determine whether there is any 
statistically significant relationship for the above variables. 
The second part of this study compared two groups, namely companies among the top 
100 most black-empowered JSE companies, and companies that were not among the 
top 100 most black-empowered companies, to test whether the two groups performed 
differently in terms of profitability and revenue growth. SPSS was also used to perform 
the examination and data analysis using the t-test. 
The following three indicators were used as representative of the financial performance 
of a company, in comparison with other companies: 
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• Revenue growth – demonstrates an overall percentage increase in the revenue 
of a company. In this case, the collected data compared revenue for the 
previous year with that of the present year. 
• Net profit margin – represents a ratio of profit with the total revenue of the 
company. It represents the amount earned by a company in terms of profits with 
each rand they get as revenue. 
• Return on equity (ROE) – shows the percentage net income of total shareholder 
equity. It encapsulates the profit earned by the investors over their stakes in the 
company. 
The literature review was undertaken to establish definitions of the theoretical 
constructs used in this research. The review was done from existing studies reflected 
in academic journals, books, publications, websites, legislation, government 
publications, charters and the Codes, existing government-documented speeches and 
documents, and documents from South African trade unions and legislation. 
1.9 LIMITATION OF THIS STUDY 
The limitation of this study include the following: 
1.9.1 Legislation changes 
The B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 was amended in 2013. The main significant change 
was to make it compulsory for organs of state and public entities to apply as opposed 
to just taking into account the Codes when issuing licences, concessions or other 
authorisations, implementing preferential procurement policy, selling state-owned 
enterprises, partnering with the private sector, and awarding incentives, grants and 
investment schemes (dti 2013a). This change makes it a necessity for most companies 
to comply with B-BBEE. The outcomes of these changes to legislation did not form part 
of this study as the changes only became applicable from 1 May 2015, and the result 
of BEE legislation that came into effect 2015 can only be measured in the following 
year. The current study was concluded in 2016 already. 
Another change that was made within the Codes was that the required points of 
compliance on all B-BBEE status levels have been increased, and the new Codes 
became more stringent, which might result in companies with high B-BBEE scores 
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having an even bigger competitive advantage because it became more difficult to 
comply with the new Codes (Sebata 2015). The scope of this study did not cover the 
effect of the change, as the amendments were only effective from 1 May 2015. 
1.9.2 Limited data published by Empowerdex  
There is no national database on BEE scores covering all companies in South Africa, 
which limited this study to the data published by third parties. The BEE scores of 
companies listed on the JSE and published by Empowerdex covers only the Top 100 
empowered companies, which limited the current study in terms of regression analysis 
on only these 100 companies, as other companies, which did not fall in this category, 
were excluded from the sample due to unavailability of their scores. 
1.9.3 Short-term effect of BEE scores 
In the current study, the correlation between BEE scores and revenue and profit growth 
effect was tested for only one year following the year of BEE scoring. This test limits 
the effect of BEE scores to short-term only and does not explore the long-term effects 
of BEE scores. 
1.9.4 Use of secondary data 
This study dealt with historical information, such as profits, revenue and BEE scores; 
therefore, the researcher was limited to using secondary data. There are a few 
disadvantages using secondary data, which Sachdeva (2009:110) points out. Firstly, 
the information gathered would not have been gathered for the research dealt with in 
the current study, and as a result, the data gathered and the data needed for this study 
may vary. Secondly, the secondary data gathered was not sufficient to address the 
research question of the current study. In this study, the limitation was − as outlined 
above − that the data was limited to the scores of the Top 100 companies only as 
opposed to all companies. Lastly, the data gathered may have been inaccurate or had 
errors. These were beyond the control of the researcher and it was difficult to evaluate 
accuracy (Sachdeva 2009:157). The data used was regarded as reliant mainly 
because Empowerdex is a leading B-BBEE verification company in South Africa. 
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1.10 EXPLANATION OF KEY TERMS 
BEE 
BEE (black economic empowerment), which is currently referred to as B-BBEE since 
the broad-based element was introduced in 2003, is a government policy for advancing 
black people in business and economy in general (dti 2003a:5). 
Revenue 
Revenue is defined in International Accounting Standards (IAS) 18 of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (International Accounting Standards Board 
[IASB] 1995:1). The present study was done for 2007-2013 at which stage IAS 18 for 
revenue was applicable. IAS 18 defines revenue income that arises in the normal 
course of business from sales, fees, interest, dividends and royalties (IASB 1995:1). 
Net profit margin 
The net profit margin is calculated as a percentage of the net profit over revenue 
(Totowa 2015:50). It is used to measure the operating efficiency of the company 
(Totowa 2015:50). 
Return on equity 
Return on equity (ROE) is the net income as a percentage of shareholders’ equity 
(Mainul 2012:132). It is used to measure the rate at which money invested generates 
profits for the company (Ahsan 2012:132). 
1.11 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
The chapter layout of this dissertation is as follows: 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduced the study and provided background on BEE compliance in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reflects the literature on BEE, BEE compliance, and its influence on 
financial performance of companies that specifically focus on revenue and profitability. 
The chapter specifically covers the literature on the history of BEE, and how it evolved 
over the years. The literature review on objectives of BEE, the definition relating to 
BEE and its challenges and the way changes to legislation have evolved are dealt with 
in this chapter. Finally, changes to legislation and previous contributions by other 
researches will conclude the literature review. 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
This chapter describes the research methodology that was used in this study. 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This chapter presents an interpretation and analysis of the research data collected, 
and compares it with current theory and literature. 
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarises the research findings. It also summarises the conclusions of 
the study. The chapter further includes recommendations of further study in BEE and 
disclosure in the integrated reports. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, the status quo and progress relating to BEE in terms of companies listed 
on the JSE were discussed. This chapter reflects the literature on BEE, BEE 
compliance, and the way BEE influences financial performance of companies with 
specific focus on revenue and profitability. Specifically, this chapter covers the 
literature on the history of BEE and how it evolved over the years. The literature review 
on objectives of BEE (see 2.4), the definition relating to BEE and its challenges (see 
2.6) and the way changes to legislation have evolved (see 2.7) are dealt with. Finally, 
changes to legislation and previous contributions by other researches will conclude the 
literature review (see 2.8). 
2.2 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT (BEE) 
Prior to 1994, South Africa had laws that prevented black people from fully participating 
in the economy of the country (Hiam, Eshghi & Eshghi 2017:1370). Black people were 
not allowed to own land or perform business outside of their designated areas, which 
prevented them from trading on the outskirts of white populated towns and cities. 
Although some of the prohibitions and restrictions were not legislated, black people 
were not allowed to own property even within their designated areas (dti 2003a; Jack 
& Harris 2007). Where business was concerned, black people were restricted to 
owning single operations within the designated areas (dti 2003a; Jack & Harris 2007). 
Although the majority of these laws were relaxed in the mid-1980s, some restrictions 
were still applicable, which implied that the economic growth amongst black people 
was still limited. 
These restrictions and laws led to unrest in South Africa in the 1970s, and the world 
debated on the appropriateness of the apartheid system, which resulted in economic 
and political sanctions against South Africa by various countries (Jack & Harris 2007). 
At that stage, it became clear to the government at the time that apartheid had failed 
and needed to end (Jack & Harris 2007). Elliott, Hufbauer and Oegg (2008) also 
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explain that, following the Sharpeville massacre in the 1960s, other countries applied 
pressure on the former president, Mr FW de Klerk, to release Mr Nelson Mandela from 
prison. That subsequently led to the beginning of the new democracy in South Africa 
in 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) won the national elections (Elliott 
et al. 2008). 
The ANC assumed office with a few challenges on its table after winning the elections, 
one of them being racial inequality in the country despite economic growth both before 
and after 1994 (Nattrass & Seekings 2010:5). It was clear that the end of apartheid did 
not immediately result in improved material conditions for the majority of South Africans 
(Aliber, Kirsten, Maharajh, Nhlapo-Hlope & Nkoane 2006:47). During the apartheid era, 
the ruling government ensured that only white South Africans had skills, opportunities, 
and high incomes, whilst many black South Africans lacked skills, faced few 
opportunities, and remained in poverty (Nattrass & Seekings 2010:5). The ANC 
decided to prioritise deracialisation of business ownership by means of BEE policies 
to deal with continuing white economic control and income inequalities. This was 
declared one of the central objectives in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994 (Tangri & Southall 2008:699). 
The BEE vision of government was mainly based on the Freedom Charter of 1955, 
which had as one of its objectives meeting the economic needs of the South African 
people equitably (dti 2003a). According to the Freedom Charter, the country’s wealth 
and resources should be shared amongst people in South Africa, to create a 
democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society in South Africa (Congress 
of the People 1955). In addition to this, Chabano et al. (2006:562) mention that this 
objective is further promoted by the country’s Constitution, which promotes equality 
and advances people who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
In the mid-1990s, government decided to introduce a few policies to address the 
inherent inequalities regarding issues of affirmative action, employment equity, land 
reform, the establishment of sector education and training authorities, and the 
introduction of BEE policies (Patel & Graham 2012:194). The specific laws introduced 
were the: 
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• Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, No. 52 of 
2002;  
• Extension of Security of Tenure Act, No. 62 of 1997;  
• Restitution of Land Rights Act, No. 22 of 1994;  
• Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998; 
• National Empowerment Fund Act, No. 105 of 1998;  
• Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998;  
• Telecommunications Act, No. 103 of 1996;  
• Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, No. 5 of 2000; and  
• Minerals and Petroleum Development Act, No. 28 of 2002 (dti 2003a). 
BEE started by being mainly self-regulatory (Tangri & Southall 2008:700). These early 
stages of a self-regulatory environment of the BEE resulted in government not being 
able to compel white-dominated companies to deracialise the businesses completely 
(Tangri & Southall 2008:700). Although some of the listed companies had started 
placing black people voluntarily on their boards of directors and selling some of the 
equity to them (Hiam et al. 2017:1371), the result was a slow pace of transfer of the 
corporate sector to black South Africans. Tangri and Southall (2008:700) are of the 
opinion that the slow pace in the transfer of the corporate sector to black South Africans 
was the result of government’s lack of focus on policies, which supported this view. 
Instead, government pursued several economic policies simultaneously, including 
government’s persuasion of white-owned business to focus on generating higher rates 
of economic growth while pursuing policies to get white-owned businesses to transfer 
equity to black South Africans. Balancing these two policies proved to be difficult for 
government, which led to the slow implementation of BEE (Tangri & Southall 
2008:700). Nattrass and Seekings (2010:8) also support this view explaining the 
modest attempts by government to promote black-owned business in the mid-1990s, 
and only acting aggressively in the early 2000s. By then, government introduced the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, No. 5 of 2000 to address the 
empowerment of black people. Government was taking advantage of being the largest 
buyer of goods and service to support economic policy objectives of BEE. The 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (No. 5 of 2000) was meant to make 
government tendering accessible to black people and introduced a black 
empowerment point system in awarding these tenders to targeted groups (dti 2003a). 
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The biggest initial challenge regarding BEE was the lack of capital amongst black 
people. To deal with this problem, companies started setting up ‘special purpose 
vehicles’ to house financing structures for the BEE deals (dti 2003c). Financial 
institutions using equity acquired in the companies as collateral to finance black 
entrepreneurs (Chabano et al. 2006:563). The idea was that, in time, the increase in 
value of the shares would eventually outweigh the finance cost incurred in acquiring 
the equity. According to Chabano et al. (2006:563), more than half of the black 
ownership in the late 1990s was financed through these special purpose vehicles. This 
created complex structures that left black people who participated in these deals highly 
indebted (dti 2003a). The high indebtedness was exposed considerably when the 
market crashed in 1998, as it left many black people with high debts and less value in 
terms of their shares (dti 2003a). As a result, the control of black-owned companies 
decreased from 10% to 4.3% between 1998 and 1999 (Chabano et al. 2006:564). The 
implication was that, effectively − besides a few − black people enjoyed limited benefits 
from these BEE deals. It was clear at that stage that BEE based solely on ownership 
was not sustainable (Jack & Harris 2007). According to Sartorius and Botha 
(2004:437), the stock market crash of 1998 led many critics to question the success of 
BEE. 
As Arya and Bassi (2011:689) explain, at that point, government had to consider that 
transformation of the corporate world was a monumental task since it involved decades 
of social and racial imbalances in the economy. As a result, government could not 
leave the transformation to be purely voluntary and had to include government 
regulations to motivate and enforce BEE initiatives (Arya & Bassi 2011:689). 
According to Chabano et al. (2006:563), at its 1997 conference, the BMF resolved that 
a BEE Commission should be set up to address BEE issues. The Commission was 
successfully established in 1998, chaired by Cyril Ramaphosa. They presented a BEE 
Commission report to former President Thabo Mbeki in 2001 (Chabano et al. 
2006:563). At that stage, the BEE Commission reported that since 1994, there had 
been no significant change in the overall inequality and wealth and, as a result, black 
people remained poor and marginalised from ownership, control and management of 
economic activities (BEE Commission 2001:1). 
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The report further blamed the lack of growth prospects and competitiveness in South 
Africa on the lack of significant change in transformation of the economic activities in 
the country (BEE Commission 2001:1). At that stage, government needed to come up 
with broad-based initiatives that addressed the lower- and middle-income groups of 
the country, so that they too could take part in the economy of the country (Jack & 
Harris 2007). The Commission then recommended that the state create black 
empowering guidelines and regulations, which will compel the state and the private 
sector to adopt black empowerment policies (Southall 2004:323). 
Following the report of the BEE Commission, government contended that the rate of 
sharing the economic success of the country by all races of South Africa was not 
satisfactory. What made this worse was also that, even if there was some progress, it 
was very difficult to quantify (Southall 2004:318), and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (dti) was of the opinion that government needed to introduce a comprehensive 
and focused strategy for Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) (dti 
2003a). This B-BBEE strategy document was drawn up as “South Africa’s Economic 
Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment” (dti 
2003a). This document outlined the broad-based BEE strategy and steps that 
government needed to take to deal effectively with BEE. Following the B-BBEE 
strategy document was the promulgation of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003. 
According to the B-BBEE strategy, government set out to form partnerships and 
collaboration with the private sector to ensure that BEE is sustainable (dti 2003a). One 
way government intended to collaborate with the private sector was by encouraging 
the setting-up of sector and enterprise-based charters (dti 2003a). Various sectors 
would be allowed to determine ways and targets that would contribute to BEE within 
parameters of existing legislation (dti 2003a). The strategy on sector charters was 
supported by the Minerals and Petroleum Development Resources Act, No. 28 of 
2002, which has similar regulations. Section 100 of the Minerals and Petroleum 
Development Resources Act, No. 28 of 2002 requires the development of a Broad-
Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter that would set the framework and 
targets to enable historically disadvantaged South Africans to benefit from exploitation 
of mining and mineral resources (dti 2003b). Section 25 of the Minerals and Petroleum 
Development Resources Act, No. 28 of 2002 further requires holders of mining rights 
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and permits to comply with this charter (dti 2003b). According to Jack and Harris 
(2007), this charter had a significant influence in that there was an increase in BEE 
deals on the JSE resources sector following the release of the charter. 
Financial services followed almost immediately in response to the B-BBEE strategy 
and mining charter with its Financial Services Charter in October 2003. Tangri and 
Southall (2008:705) are of the opinion that the Financial Services Charter was released 
rapidly to pre-empt government intervention. 
This intervention came in the form of the B-BBEE Strategy document, which stated: 
Government will introduce into Parliament a Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Bill to establish an enabling framework for the promotion of BEE in 
South Africa. In particular, the legislation will allow the Minister of Trade and 
Industry to issue guidelines and the Codes on BEE, as well as establish a BEE 
Council to advise the President on the implementation of BEE and related matters 
(dti 2003c:18). 
Government introduced the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, which was signed into law in 
January 2004 (dti 2003a:18). This B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 was amended in 2013 
by the B-BBEE Act, No. 46 of 2013. 
2.3 DEFINITION OF BEE 
The following sections deal with the definitions of BEE and B-BBEE. 
2.3.1 BEE Commission’s definition of BEE 
The BEE Commission argued that BEE was often defined narrowly by focusing on 
entry and transaction activities (BEE Commission 2001:1). The consequence thereof 
was that black people were not included in other economic activities adequately (BEE 
Commission 2001:1). According to Code 000 Statement 000, section 1 of the Codes, 
‘black people’ means natural persons who are citizens of South Africa by birth, descent 
or naturalisation before 1994, and who are African, Coloured or Indian by race (dti 
2007). The BEE Commission report contended that there was a need to define BEE, 
since black people were still excluded from financial and economic resources in the 
country (BEE Commission 2001:2). It further suggested that BEE had to incorporate 
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comprehensive strategies with the objective of increasing access to productive assets 
whilst simultaneously ensuring the productivity of those assets. That would ensure that 
levels of participation in ownership, management and control of economic activities by 
black people were increased, thereby creating jobs, rural development, alleviating 
poverty, promoting land ownership, empowering women, and improving education 
(BEE Commission 2001:2). 
The BEE Commission formed a broader BEE definition – considering a sustainable 
programme – as follows: 
[A]n integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within the 
context of the country’s national transformation programme, namely the RDP. It is 
aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and 
equitably transfer and confer the ownership, management, and control of South 
Africa’s financial and economic resources to the majority of its citizens. It seeks to 
ensure broader and meaningful participation in the economy by Black people to 
achieve sustainable development and prosperity (BEE Commission 2001:2). 
2.3.2 Strategy for broad-based BEE definition 
Government was in agreement with the BEE Commission in its B-BBEE Strategy 
document on the definition of BEE that it should not be defined narrowly, as that would 
limit transfers of corporate assets from black people to white people without being in 
line with the RDP (dti 2003a). Government however cautioned that a broad definition 
of BEE would be too general. Government therefore concluded that a balance should 
be found between the narrow definition and a broad definition (dti 2003a), and has 
subsequently defined BEE as: 
[A]n integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly contributes to 
the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significant increases 
in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control the country’s 
economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities, in the Broad-based 
BEE Strategy document (dti 2003c). 
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2.3.3 The Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act definition 
of BEE 
The B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 definition of BEE is also broad-based; however, it 
differs in content from both the BEE Commission and the Strategy for B-BBEE, as it is 
more detailed and specific. It does not define BEE as is, but defines broad-based BEE. 
Section 1 of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 (dti 2003a:5) defines B-BBEE as follows: 
The economic empowerment of all black people in particular women, workers, 
youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but 
integrated socio-economic strategies that include, but are not limited to – 
a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control 
enterprises and productive assets; 
b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets 
by communities, workers, co-operatives and other collective enterprises; 
c) human resource and skills development; 
d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels 
in the workforce; 
e) preferential procurement from enterprises that are owned or managed by 
black people; and 
f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people. 
Following the definitions by the abovementioned documents, the objectives of BEE are 
discussed in the next section. 
2.4 OBJECTIVES OF BEE 
Jack and Harris (2007) present three imperatives on which BEE should be based. The 
first imperative is a moral issue in correcting imbalances created by apartheid. The 
second imperative is the social issue of wealth divide, especially in a South African 
context that is denoted by racial categories. The authors contend that wealth divide is 
problematic in capitalist societies since it causes various ills in society. The third 
important imperative is economic growth, since at the time (2007), unemployment was 
measured at around 30%, which implies that the country was running at only two thirds 
of its labour potential (Jack & Harris 2007). 
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As Jack and Harris (2007:15) explain, the main aim of BEE is to drive economic growth 
by introducing poor people into the mainstream economy and allowing them to enjoy 
the economic benefits of the capitalist system. Nattrass and Seekings (2010:30) 
compare BEE to the Afrikaner Economic Empowerment of the apartheid government. 
The aim of BEE and the Afrikaner Economic Empowerment was to alter the distribution 
of assets and income in the direction of a particular group, in the case of BEE being 
black people. By driving broad-based BEE from all levels as opposed to waiting for it 
to happen on a purely free-market basis, Jack and Harris (2007:15) contend that black 
empowerment will take less time, which will suit the government, since government 
does not enjoy unlimited time to transform the country politically. The broad-based BEE 
policy promotes growth instead of pure redistribution through the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 
of 2003 and the Codes (Jack & Harris 2007:15). 
The BEE Commission captured what they called a fundamental crisis in the economy 
of South Africa, as black people remain excluded from financial and economic 
resources of the country (BEE Commission 2001:2). To resolve this problem, the BEE 
Commission suggested that the B-BBEE strategy should have an objective of 
increasing access by black people to productive assets without compromising 
productivity of those assets. Further, B-BBEE strategy should aim to increase 
participation of black people in business ownership, business management and control 
of economic activities. The BEE Commission goes on to propose that BEE should be 
viewed in the context of “job creation, rural development, urban renewal, poverty 
alleviation, land ownership, specific measures to empower black women, skills and 
management development, education, meaningful ownership and access to finance 
for purpose of conducting business” (BEE Commission 2001:2). 
A Strategy for Broad-Based BEE then clarifies that the measure of success of the 
abovementioned objectives for BEE implementation will be evaluated against a 
significant increase in the following: 
• black people who own and control new and existing enterprises; 
• number of new black enterprises; 
• black-empowered enterprises; 
• black-engendered enterprises; 
• black executives in enterprises; 
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• black senior managers in enterprises; 
• community broad-based enterprises; 
• cooperatives; 
• black ownership of land and other productive assets; 
• improved access to infrastructure by black people; 
• acquisition of skills by black people; and 
• participation in productive economic activities by black people (dti 2003a). 
The B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 echoes similar objectives to the BEE Commission 
and the Strategy for B-BBEE. According to the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 (dti 
2003a:6), the objectives of BEE are: 
a) Promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of 
black people in the economy 
b) achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and 
management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new 
enterprises 
c) increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other 
collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and 
increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training 
d) increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new 
enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and 
skills training 
e) promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful 
participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable 
development and general prosperity 
f) empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic 
activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills  
g) promoting access to finance for black economic empowerment. 
2.5 THE CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE 
In order to achieve the objectives of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, the Act provides 
the Minister of Trade and Industry with authority to issue the Codes through the 
Government Gazette (dti 2003a). The Minister of Trade and Industry gazetted the 
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Codes on 9 February 2007 (Jack & Harris 2007:43). According to section 9 of the B-
BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 (dti 2003a:8), the Codes may include the following: 
a) the further interpretation and definition of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment 
and the interpretation and definition of different categories of black empowerment 
entities 
b) qualification criteria for preferential purposes for procurement and other economic 
activities 
c) indicators to measure Broad-Based Black economic empowerment 
d) the weighting to be attached to Broad-Based Black economic empowerment indicators 
referred to in paragraph (c) 
e) guidelines for stakeholders in the relevant sectors of the economy to draw up 
transformation charters and the Codes for their sector 
f) any other matter necessary to achieve the objectives of this Act. 
The organs of state and public entities are obliged by the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 
to use the Codes to determine the qualification criteria for issuing licences, sale of 
state-owned enterprises, developing and implementing preferential procurement 
policies and setting criteria for entering into partnerships with the private sector (dti 
2003a). The key tool that makes BEE useful is that the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act, No. 5 of 2000 encourages the organs of state and public entities to 
give preference to businesses that have high BEE ratings on their BEE level, 
determined by using the Codes, when procuring their goods and services (Department 
of Finance 2000). This implies that a company with a high BEE score will more likely 
meet the qualification criteria and even be preferred in being awarded contracts to 
supply goods and services to government because of the provisions of the Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act, No. 5 of 2000 mentioned above. 
It must be noted though that, according to the Codes, there is no legal requirement for 
BEE compliance or even obtaining a certain score according to the Codes; it is rather 
a commercial incentive (Jack & Harris 2007:44). The benefit is being favoured by 
procurement policies when government awards contracts (Van der Merwe & Ferreira 
2014:548). The companies which are more BEE-compliant would, through this 
commercial incentive, have a competitive advantage in the form of higher revenue and 
profitability (Kleynhans & Kruger 2014:5). At the time that the Codes were gazetted, 
ANC members of Parliament’s Trade and Industry Committee were not happy with the 
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lack of legal enforceability, and regarded the Codes as too soft on companies, and 
argued that it would prevent the strategy of BEE objectives from being achieved (Tangri 
& Southall 2008:706). 
Although BEE compliance is not a legal requirement, there is an exception in the 
mining industry. As explained in 2.2 above, the Minerals and Petroleum Development 
Resources Act, No. 28 of 2002 requires mining houses to comply with the mining 
charter. This charter has a BEE target that has to be met. One of these targets is that 
companies need to have 26% black ownership by 2014 or risk losing their mining rights 
and licences. In her May 2013 budget speech, the then Minister of Mineral Resources, 
Susan Shabangu, made it clear that the government would not back down and the 
mining houses would have to meet these targets (Peyper 2013:36). 
The Codes attempt to address the lack of legal requirement discussed above. Besides 
the fact that a higher BEE score benefiting the company from accessing government 
contracts (Mehta & Ward 2017:85), the Codes have been set up in a way that there is 
a trickle-down effect on many companies. Preferential procurement elements in the 
Codes are allocated a specific score. This implies that companies would get specific 
points if they procure from companies that are BEE-compliant. According to Jack and 
Harris (2007:45), companies wishing to increase their BEE ratings, would normally 
procure their goods and services from companies with high BEE ratings. This causes 
companies to compel one another to comply with BEE without the law enforcing this.  
Although it is not clear yet from the B-BBEE Act, No. 46 of 2013 what the new B-BBEE 
Commissioner would do with the information after receiving it, in section 13G, the Act 
requires that all JSE-listed companies should report their B-BBEE compliance to the 
B-BBEE Commissioner (dti 2013a). 
Statement 000 of the Codes discusses the framework of broad-based BEE, which 
states that organisations that are subject to the Codes are all public entities listed in 
Schedule 2 and 3 of the Public Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999, including 
state trading entities, any company that undertakes business with any organ of state 
or public entity, and any other company which seeks to be BEE-compliant (dti 2007:04) 
and which are measured for BEE compliance in the following four categories: 
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• exempted micro-enterprises, which are companies with a total revenue of 
R5 million or less; 
• qualifying small enterprises, which are companies with a total revenue of not 
less than R5 million but less than R35 million; 
• start-up enterprises, which are companies that are in their first year of being 
incorporated or formed; and 
• generic enterprises, which are companies that have a total revenue of 
R35 million and above (dti 2007:04). 
For purposes of this study, which focused on the JSE-listed companies, the generic 
enterprises category applied as all companies listed on the JSE had revenue 
exceeding R35 million between 2007 and 2013 (dti 2007). 
Furthermore, Arya and Bassi (2011:678) note the purpose of the Codes as providing 
the standards, specific targets, and performance measures for purposes of 
transforming South African businesses and improving companies’ social responsibility 
relating to BEE. Jack and Harris (2007:66) elaborate by explaining the main aim of the 
Codes as having a standard measurement system that can measure all entities. This 
standardised system, referred to as ‘the Codes’ in this instance, has seven elements 
for generic enterprises as described in Table 2.1: 
  
  28
Table 2.1: Definitions of BEE elements 
Element Purpose 
Ownership Measures the effective ownership of enterprises by black people 
Management control Measures the effective control of enterprises by black people 
Employment equity 
Measures initiatives intended to achieve equity in the workplace 
under the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998  
Skills development 
Measures the extent to which employers carry out initiatives 
designed to develop the competencies of black employees 
Preferential 
procurement 
Measures the extent to which enterprises buy goods and 
services from suppliers with strong B-BBEE procurement 
recognition levels 
Enterprise development 
Measures the extent to which enterprises carry out initiatives 
intended to assist and accelerate the development and 
sustainability of other enterprises 
Socio-economic 
development  
Measures the extent to which enterprises carry out initiatives 
that contribute towards socio-economic development or sector-
specific initiatives 
Source: dti (2007) 
The first four elements in Table 2.1 are mainly internal to the company, since they 
focus on the company itself in terms of company ownership, its management, 
employees and their development. The remaining three elements relate to what the 
company can do for other stakeholders outside of the company, such as other small 
businesses, other black-empowered businesses, and other organisations that are 
developing black people economically. The structure of these elements is constituent 
with recommendations of the Strategy on B-BBEE (Tangri & Southall 2008:706). The 
Strategy on B-BBEE recommends that BEE should be broad-based and be based on 
three core elements, namely: 
• Direct empowerment through ownership and control, which recommends that 
the whole process of BEE should ultimately achieve increased levels of 
ownership and control of assets and enterprises by black people. This should 
also achieve significant participation of black people in boards of directors and 
executive management (dti 2003c). 
• Human resources development and employment equity, which recommends 
that black employees of enterprises should be developed and companies 
should comply with the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998 in order that 
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there can be equitable representation of black people at all levels of the 
organisation (dti 2003c). 
• Indirect empowerment, which recommends creation and nurturing of new black-
empowered enterprises. This can be achieved through preferential procurement 
by government. The sub-element of indirect empowerment is investment in 
black-owned and black-empowered enterprises by giving financial and 
intellectual support to these enterprises (dti 2003c). 
The abovementioned BEE elements are weighed and points are allocated in the form 
of a scorecard as per Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: BEE scorecard 
Element Weighting 
Ownership 20 points 
Management control 10 points 
Employment equity 15 points 
Skills development 15 points 
Preferential procurement 20 points 
Enterprise development 15 points 
Socio-economic development    5 points 
Source: dti (2007) 
According to the Codes and based on the points scored as per Table 2.2, the measured 
entity would then receive a B-BBEE status as per Table 2.3, which gives the measured 
entity a BEE procurement recognition level. 
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Table 2.3: B-BBEE procurement recognition levels 
B-BBEE status Qualification 
B-BBEE 
procurement 
recognition level 
Level 1 contributor ≥ 100 points on the generic scorecard 135% 
Level 2 contributor 
≥ 85 but < 100 points on the generic 
scorecard 
125% 
Level 3 contributor 
≥ 75 but < 85 points on the generic 
scorecard 
110% 
Level 4 contributor ≥ 65 but < 75 on the generic scorecard 100% 
Level 5 contributor ≥ 55 but < 65 on the generic scorecard 80% 
Level 6 contributor ≥ 45 but < 55 on the generic scorecard 60% 
Level 7 contributor ≥ 40 but < 45 on the generic scorecard 50% 
Level 8 contributor ≥ 30 but < 40 on the generic scorecard 10% 
Non-compliant contributor < 30 on the generic scorecard 0% 
Source: dti (2007) 
Table 2.3 indicates the level of procurement recognition a company would be able to 
claim if it were to procure from a company with a certain B-BBEE status. For example, 
a company procuring from a Level 1 BEE contributor would be able to claim 135% of 
the amount spent on that company towards its points under the preferential 
procurement element. Jack and Harris (2007:26) state that preferential procurement is 
the key driver of the BEE process. This is mainly because the procurement recognition 
level becomes very important for companies in terms of trading purposes. For 
companies to maximise their BEE score level, they would need to prefer procuring from 
companies which have a high BEE score as that would boost their own BEE scores 
under the preferential procurement element (Jack & Harris 2007:84). By implication, if 
the argument by Jack and Harris (2007:84) is true, then companies with high BEE 
scores and therefore high procurement recognition levels, would be preferred suppliers 
to most companies and therefore would generate more revenue than companies with 
lower scores. 
It is evident from the above that the Codes encourage companies to do the following: 
• ownership element: let black people acquire at least 25% of the company’s 
shares; 
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• management control: appoint at least 40% of black people in the company’s 
management structures; 
• employment equity: employ a majority of black people in various roles and 
positions; 
• skills development: spend at least 3% of the total payroll spend on developing 
skills of black employees; 
• preferential procurement: buy at least most of the raw materials and other 
products and services from BEE-compliant companies; 
• enterprise development: encourage companies to invest in developing small 
businesses that are black-owned; and 
• socio-economic development: spend at least 1% of the profits on socio-
economic programmes and organisations on black beneficiaries. 
2.6 CHALLENGES WITH BEE 
The following sections (see 2.6.1 to 2.6.8) explain some of the challenges of BEE. 
2.6.1 Black elite 
There is bound to be challenges and criticisms in terms of a significantly game-
changing policy, such as BEE. One of the most commonly identified challenges for the 
BEE policy was the creation of a few wealthy black elite without any significant benefit 
filtering down to the poor (Sartorious & Botha 2008:437), who especially need to be 
empowered economically to rise above their poor living conditions. Sartorious and 
Botha (2008:437) suggest that BEE only benefits politically connected black elite. 
Tangri and Southall (2008:700) support this view, and confirm that the majority of 
previously disadvantaged black people do not benefit from the BEE policies. This 
results in the problems created by apartheid like poverty, unemployment, housing, 
inequalities and a lack of basic services, remaining challenges in the democratic South 
Africa (Krüger 2011:212). 
It must be noted that the black elite who are benefiting from BEE are no ordinary South 
African black people. They are described as politically connected individuals, some 
having been in prison or in exile during the apartheid regime (Chabano et al. 2006:564). 
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Some are well educated and/or have good working experience abroad (Chabano et al. 
2006:564). Some of the names of these individuals are mentioned below: 
• Dr Nthatho Motlana – President Nelson Mandela’s personal physician; 
• Cyril Ramaphosa – former secretary general of ANC; 
• Mzi Khumalo – a prison mate to President Nelson Mandela on Robben Island 
(Chabano et al. 2006:564); 
• Saki Macozoma – ANC spokesperson;  
• Patrice Motsepe – whose wife is well connected in the ANC; 
• Tokyo Sexwale – premier of Gauteng;  
• Mathews Phosa – premier of Mpumalanga and later treasurer of the ANC; 
• Popo Molefe – premier of North-West; 
• Moss Ngoasheng – former advisor of President Thabo Mbeki; and 
• Zwelakhe Sisulu – son of Mr Walter Sisulu (Nattrass & Seekings 2010:30). 
South Africans are familiar with these individuals because of their involvement in 
politics. 
One of the reasons why mainly politically connected individuals were the ones 
benefiting from BEE was the fear by established white-owned businesses that the BEE 
policies and processes would intrude on their businesses (Tangri & Southall 
2008:710). As a result, they ensured that they gave equity to politically connected 
individuals who served as leaders in the structures of the ANC so that they could in 
turn protect their assets (Tangri & Southall 2008:710). Conducting business in this way 
is however a costly exercise, as equity has to be transferred to BEE partners at 
discounted prices (Nattrass & Seekings 2010:8). 
Patel and Graham (2012:201) are of a slightly different view as they argue that, 
although BEE mainly benefited the few black elite, parts of it benefited designated 
broad-based groups, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, 
company employee structures and educational trusts. The structures mainly consist of 
poor black beneficiaries. These structures and organisations were given stakes in 
some of the JSE-listed companies (Patel & Graham 2012:201). 
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2.6.2 Tenderpreneurs 
An extension to the above criticism of BEE is the creation of tenderpreneurs instead of 
real entrepreneurs. The term ‘tenderpreneur’ is unofficially used in South Africa to 
describe a person who accumulates wealth solely from doing business with 
government (Mackenzie-Hoy 2013). These tenderpreneurs have created a culture of 
entitlement and dependency of the state business (Kruger 2014:98) without becoming 
real entrepreneurs (Mbeki 2012). In the words of Moeletsi Mbeki (2012): 
The second problem with the formula of BEE is that it does not create 
entrepreneurs. You are taking political leaders and politically connected people 
and giving them assets, which, in the first instance, they do not know how to 
manage. Therefore, you are not adding value. You are faced with the threat of 
undermining value by taking assets from people who were managing them and 
giving them to people who cannot manage them. BEE thus creates a class of idle 
rich ANC politicos. 
My quarrel with BEE is that what the conglomerates are doing is developing a new 
culture in SA - not a culture of entrepreneurship, but an entitlement culture, 
whereby black people who want to go into business think that they should acquire 
assets free, and that somebody is there to make them rich, rather than that they 
should build enterprises from the ground. 
2.6.3 BEE deals finance 
Financing of BEE deals is another challenge. As discussed under the Codes (see 2.5 
above), ownership has a significant weighting of points on the BEE scorecard. This 
implies that in order to earn higher points, companies need to promote equity owned 
by black people (Southall 2004:319). This, however, poses a challenge, as black 
people – coming from economically disadvantaged backgrounds – would not have 
enough capital to buy equity from corporate institutions. This, in turn, forces black 
investors to acquire the equity with assistance from financial institutions, who keep the 
equity acquired as security, and investors have to rely on dividends received to finance 
the interest (Southall 2004:319). The challenge here is that, when equity price 
appreciation and dividend payouts are lower than the interest rate for these financed 
deals, the black investors end up falling short on repayments of these loans, which 
forces the banks to repossess the equity kept as security for the loans. This was 
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demonstrated when the market crashed in 1998, which left many black people with 
high debts and less value of their shares (dti 2003c). The other alternative is that the 
BEE partners are bailed out by the company. This method, however, confuses the 
international shareholders since whenever the BEE partners are bailed for purposes 
of keeping the black ownership intact, there shares are diluted (Peyper 2013:39). 
2.6.4 Business unity 
Nattrass and Seekings (2010:24) argue that, in the same way as during apartheid, BEE 
policies have undermined business unity between white- and black-owned businesses 
because the BEE policies favour black owners and business managers over white 
owners and business managers. Patel and Graham (2012:205) support this view by 
questioning whether race-based empowerment is fair opposed to the empowerment 
covering all disadvantaged groups, irrespective of race, which will bring more unity 
rather than racial division. This view is influenced by the reality that there are some 
white people who are poor and who also need some form of empowerment. 
Furthermore, there are white businesses that are struggling in the new South Africa 
that also need empowerment. 
2.6.5 Unemployment and poverty remain 
One of the objectives of B-BBEE according to the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 is 
“promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful 
participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable 
development and general prosperity” (dti 2003a:6). Unfortunately, Chabano et al. 
(2006:574) contend that unemployment and poverty issues remain a challenge despite 
BEE policies. According to Stats SA (2014), unemployment was 25.4% in the third 
quarter of 2014 compared to 20% in 1994. This implies that unemployment has 
worsened since apartheid ended. Sartorius and Botha (2008:437) suggest that BEE 
has the potential of affecting foreign investment negatively, which could make the 
challenge of unemployment even bigger. 
2.6.6 Legal enforceability 
Since BEE policies are not legally enforceable – regardless of the positive intentions 
thereof – its intended effect is slowed down. This is despite black businesses generally 
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preferring a more stringent legislative form of BEE policies (Tangri & Southall 
2008:715). Jack and Harris (2007) argue that companies in the retail and tourism 
sectors – especially companies selling large volumes of low-priced items directly to the 
public – have not embraced BEE, mainly because they have little reliance on 
government contracts and because BEE is not legally enforceable. The other reason 
for this is that the general public would not choose where to buy their goods based on 
BEE scores of any company, but rather based on quality and pricing (Jack & Harris 
2007). 
2.6.7 Lack of support by stakeholders 
For BEE to work, all stakeholders, including government, the private sector, 
management and employees have to believe in it. This did not prove to be the case in 
2010 (Krüger 2011). Krüger (2011:229) found that managers, of whom the majority 
were black and female, did not believe BEE compliance would improve the 
performance of the companies that employed them. This was specifically with regard 
to overall and international competitiveness, service excellence and client satisfaction, 
quality, productivity, entrepreneurial spirit and innovation, production performance, 
human development, staff morale, business ethics and transparency, sales and access 
to markets, and financial performance. Employees and management who should drive 
the implementation of BEE, make it difficult for companies to implement BEE if they 
are unconvinced that BEE would benefit the companies that employ them (Krüger 
2011). 
2.6.8 Selling out equity 
To attract black investors, equity is generally sold at a discount, which has a diluting 
effect on existing shareholders’ equity (Prinsloo 2015:1). The challenge with this 
method of attracting black investors is that there is no guarantee that the black investor 
would stay invested for a long time. In an article in the Sunday Times, Prinsloo (2015:1) 
indicated that the Chamber of Mines criticised black entrepreneurs in the mining 
industries for buying shares at discounted prices, and selling them back to the market 
at a later stage, leaving the companies with less black ownership or back to where the 
company was in terms of percentage black ownership. To curb this challenge, 
companies such as MTN had provided BEE equity with the condition that the black 
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people invested in these shares could sell them to non-blacks, only after six years of 
owning them (Southafrica.info 2010). 
To address some of the challenges discussed (2.6.1 to 2.6.8 above), government 
amended the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 in 2013. This also resulted in the Codes 
changing in the same year. Significant changes to both the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 
2003 and the Codes are discussed in the next section. 
2.7 CHANGES TO LEGISLATION AND CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE 
After 10 years of existence, the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 was amended on 
27 January 2013 with some significant changes, and published in Government Gazette 
37271.  
Firstly, organs of state and public entities are now obliged to apply, as opposed to just 
taking into account as per the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, the Codes when issuing 
licences, concessions or other authorisations, implementing preferential procurement 
policy, selling state-owned enterprises, partnering with the private sector and awarding 
incentives, grants and investment schemes (dti 2013b). 
Secondly, the B-BBEE Amendment Act, No. 46 of 2013 introduced the establishment 
of a B-BBEE Commission. The Commission is tasked with a few responsibilities 
overseeing the B-BBEE Amendment Act, No. 46 of 2013, and ensuring that it is 
complied with – including the newly introduced anti-fronting laws (contained in B-BBEE 
Amendment Act, No. 46 of 2013) – which makes it illegal for entities to apply BEE 
fronting practices (dti 2013a). A fronting practice is a transaction or arrangement where 
black people are used as tokens without meaningfully participating in core activities of 
the company in order to benefit the company’s BEE scores (Surroca, Tribó & Waddock 
2010:692). 
Thirdly, the previous B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, did not oblige any company to report 
its status of B-BBEE compliance (dti 2003a). The B-BBEE Amendment Act, No. 46 of 
2013 now forces public entities, organs of state and all spheres of government to report 
their B-BBEE compliance in their annual reports. The B-BBEE Amendment Act, No. 
46 of 2013 also imposes an obligation on all JSE companies to report their B-BBEE 
compliance in such a manner as may be prescribed. However, the B-BBEE 
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Amendment Act, No. 46 of 2013 is not clear on how or where the B-BBEE compliance 
by these companies should be reported (dti 2013a). 
Subsequent to the amendment of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 came the 
amendment of the Codes, which were gazetted on 11 October 2013, Gazette number 
36928. There are also a few significant changes of the new Codes compared to the 
old ones. The new Codes changed the way the scorecard B-BBEE levels are 
calculated based on the number of points the company has. Table 2.4 demonstrates 
the changes, comparing them to the old Codes. 
Table 2.4: B-BBEE status comparison 
B-BBEE status As per the Codes of 2007 As per the Codes of 2013 
Level 1 contributor 
≥ 100 points on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 100 points on the generic 
scorecard 
Level 2 contributor 
≥ 85 but < 100 points on the 
generic scorecard 
≥ 95 but < 100 points on the 
generic scorecard 
Level 3 contributor 
≥ 75 but < 85 on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 90 but < 95 on the generic 
scorecard 
Level 4 contributor 
≥ 65 but < 75 on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 80 but <90 on the generic 
scorecard 
Level 5 contributor 
≥ 55 but < 65 on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 75 but < 80 on the generic 
scorecard 
Level 6 contributor 
≥ 45 but < 55 on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 70 but < 75 on the generic 
scorecard 
Level 7 contributor 
≥ 40 but < 45 on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 55 but < 70 on the generic 
scorecard 
Level 8 contributor 
≥ 30 but < 40 on the generic 
scorecard 
≥ 40 but < 55 on the generic 
scorecard 
Non-compliant 
contributor 
< 30 on the generic scorecard < 40 on the generic scorecard 
Source: dti (2007) and dti (2013b) 
By just analysing Table 2.4, a company with a Level 2 rating with 85 points as per the 
previous Codes, would now be downgraded to Level 4, with the same points. 
Therefore, it would be more difficult for companies to receive a high B-BBEE rating per 
the new Codes. Another major change that will make it even more difficult for 
companies to achieve the desired scores, is the introduction of compliance with priority 
elements, which have been identified as ownership, skills development, enterprise and 
supplier development elements. For these three elements, companies would have to 
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meet a sub-minimum requirement of 40% of the targeted points to avoid their B-BBEE 
status level being discounted by one level down (dti 2013b). 
Another major change in the 2013 Codes is that the seven B-BBEE elements have 
now been reduced to five elements, namely ownership, management control, skills 
development, new enterprise and supplier development, and socio-economic 
development (dti 2013b). 
The classification of enterprises has also changed as displayed in Table 2.5. 
Companies with revenue of less than R10 million are now classified as exempted 
micro-enterprises compared to less than R5 million revenue per the previous Codes. 
Companies with revenue of between R10 million and R50 million would be classified 
as qualifying small enterprises, compared to revenue of between R5 million and 
R35 million per the previous Codes. Companies with revenue of more than R50 million 
would be classified as generic enterprises compared to revenue of more than 
R35 million per the previous Codes (dti 2013b). 
Table 2.5: Classification of enterprises 
Classification of 
enterprise 
As per the Codes of 2007 As per the Codes of 2013 
Exempted micro-enterprises 
Companies with revenue of 
less than R5 million 
Companies with revenue of 
less than R10 million 
Qualifying small enterprises 
Companies with revenue of 
between R5 million and 
R35 million 
Companies with revenue of 
between R10 million and 
R50 million 
Generic enterprises 
Companies with revenue of 
more than R35 million 
Companies with revenue of 
more than R50 million 
Source: dti (2007) and dti (2013b) 
2.8 PREVIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS 
Prior to changes in legislation in 2013, various researchers studied the matter. The first 
study to be considered is by Strydom et al. (2009:75), who found that investors do not 
perceive BEE transactions to have a negative effect on the value of the companies. 
Although the results of their study were not conclusive, they indicated some positive 
effects on the share prices of the companies when BEE transactions were announced. 
To support this, Alessandri et al. (2011:241) found that where equity stake for BEE 
transactions is offered at discount, the shareholders’ value is affected significantly and 
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positively. However, when equity for BEE transactions is offered at a premium, it has 
the opposite effect, where the shareholders’ value is affected negatively. Alessadri et 
al. (2011:241) attribute these results to a positive signal that discounted shares sends 
to investors about the corporate social responsibility intentions of the company. 
Although the study by Akinsomi, Kola, Ndlovu and Motloung (2016:22) focused only 
on property firms listed on the JSE, the results of their study came to the similar 
conclusion that the BEE-compliant companies have superior market returns compared 
to the non-BEE-compliant companies.  
Wolmarans and Sartorius (2009:189) concluded that there was a positive influence on 
shareholders’ wealth when announcements in terms of BEE transactions were made. 
Ward and Muller (2010) came to the same conclusion in their study, which found that 
shareholders’ wealth had returns up to 10% after 180 days of trading. This is 
attributable to a BEE deal announcement typically attracting a substantial amount of 
press coverage, which in turn results in positive image enhancement of the companies 
in question (Mehta & Ward 2017:87). 
Both these studies could imply that investors view BEE positively since it adds value 
to companies. What needs to be investigated, which was not addressed by the 
previous studies, is whether BEE has any specific financial effect, or whether it adds 
value to the companies through revenue and profits.  
Results by Ferreira and De Villiers (2011:36) were contrary to the results by Strydom 
et al. (2009:74) and Wolmarans and Sartorius (2009:189). Ferreira and De Villiers 
(2011) tested the relationship between the BEE scores of JSE-listed companies and 
market performance and found that there is in fact negative market performance when 
the BEE scores of companies are higher. It must be noted, however, that the test by 
Ferreira and De Villiers (2011) was for one year only. Ferreira and De Villiers (2011:36) 
suggest that the negative effect could be the result of companies overinvesting in BEE 
and hiring incompetent staff to get higher BEE scores. This could be due to the fact 
that the cost of implementing and maintaining a compliant BEE rating is significant 
(Mehta & Ward 2017:85). Limited research to test this has been conducted. Ferreira 
and De Villiers (2011:36) recommend that further research needs to be done around 
BEE scores and revenue change. Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014) subsequently 
conducted a similar study, this time looking into the relationship between individual 
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elements of the BEE scorecard and share returns. The study found a significant 
relationship with three of the elements. The relationship between BEE scores and the 
management control element of the BEE scorecard was found to be a positive one, 
with higher BEE score on this element resulting in positive share returns. The other 
two elements that had a significant relationship with share returns were ownership and 
preferential procurement; however, this was a negative relationship.  
In a more recent study, Mehta and Ward (2017) used data for the period 2009 to 2015. 
Their study had to determine whether there is a relationship between the BEE scores 
of JSE-listed companies and share returns. This study found that, in the short-term, 
when a company’s BEE score improves, the share returns are positive. In contrast, 
when the company’s BEE score declines, the share returns are affected negatively. 
Mehta and Ward (2017) advanced the following possible reason for these findings: the 
positive returns could be influenced by a signal that a company with a high BEE score 
could be sending to the investors that this company has good management, good 
corporate governance and transparency and that it has a good chance of obtaining 
government contracts (Mehta & Ward 2017:95). The same study further found that, 
when looking at the long-term performance share returns, the results are an inverse of 
the short-term ones. Higher BEE scores resulted in negative share returns and vice 
versa. The long-term results are consistent with those advanced by Ferreira and De 
Villiers (2011:36).  
2.9 OVERVIEW OF BEE IN PRACTICE 
The B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 has good objectives, which, if achieved would create 
better living conditions for black people. Government intended to achieve the following: 
• promote meaningful participation of black people, including black women, in the 
economy; 
• achieve change in the way companies in South Africa are owned and managed; 
• increase broader community ownership and management in enterprises, and 
give them access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training; 
• promote investment programmes that promote black people’s participation in 
the economy; 
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• give access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills to 
rural and local communities; and 
• enable black people to access finance for BEE (dti 2003a). 
This will only be attained if B-BBEE is supported by all sectors of business, which will 
ultimately result in sustainable and economic growth that benefits all South Africans 
(Dukander 2014:30). Further to that, if companies successfully implement BEE, it will 
result in promotion of the social good and economic competitiveness in the country 
(Patel & Graham 2012:195). Akinsomi et al. (2016:4) agree that it is generally 
considered that companies that are BEE-compliant are those companies that are also 
socially responsible. 
It has been more than 20 years since apartheid ended and the beginning of democracy 
in South Africa. The question is whether there has been progress in terms of 
transformation of the South African economy. According to President Jacob Zuma and 
the Minister of Trade and Industry, Minister Rob Davies, the pace of progress of BEE 
is not satisfactory. This opinion was express by both of them at the National Summit 
on B-BBEE held in October 2013 (De Wet 2013:54). 
There are; however, some scholars who previously held a different view than the 
president and the minister. According to Tangri and Southall (2008:700), there has 
been some progress in terms of BEE in business. More BEE deals have been 
concluded over the years, and more black people are becoming members of boards 
of directors and senior managers in companies (Tangri & Southall 2008:700). Also 
supporting the same view of progress is SAICA’s survey, which points out that in 2014, 
25% of the directors of the top 400 JSE-listed companies were black (South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants [SAICA] 2014) compared to 8% in 1997 (Jack & 
Harris 2007:231) and 20% in 2004 (Tangri & Southall 2008:700). Dukander (2014:30) 
is also of the opinion that there has been some progress in BEE, and an increase in 
the number of companies that are beginning to realise the significance of BEE and its 
effect on long-term success. 
De Wet (2013:54) contends that the time has arrived for South African businesses to 
take transformation seriously and give it the necessary attention, otherwise businesses 
might lose market share. This contention is similar to the conclusion reached by Krüger 
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(2011:230) following a survey where employees of various companies were 
interviewed to establish whether they believed that adoption of BEE practices would 
affect business performance in terms of turnover and financial performance. The 
results of his survey were negative since these employees believed that BEE 
compliance would not make a significant difference (Krüger 2011:230). 
To achieve BEE compliance, companies and their management in general would have 
to be convinced that compliance would benefit the company (Ferreira & De Villiers 
2011:24). This would also be beneficial to investors in decision-making to determine 
whether it is at all beneficial to invest in companies with high BEE ratings. 
In practice, BEE compliance should benefit companies in terms of revenue, and 
therefore other financial indicators as intended by the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act, No. 5 of 2000. Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014:548) agree that 
benefits of BEE compliance should be access to government contracts and new 
market opportunities (Van der Merwe & Ferreira 2014). As discussed under in 2.4 
above, the key tool that makes BEE useful is that organs of state and public entities 
are encouraged by the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, No. 5 of 2000 
to give preference to businesses that have high BEE ratings on their BEE level, 
determined by using the Codes, when procuring their goods and services (Department 
of Finance 2000). This study sought to investigate the validity thereof and whether 
companies with high BEE ratings benefit from it through higher revenue and better 
financial performance. 
There are, however, companies that believe BEE compliance would benefit their 
companies. According to Sartorius and Botha (2008:444), about 50% of companies 
believe that implementing BEE would grow their business and improve their market 
shares. However, about a third believed that they would lose market share if they do 
not comply with BEE. The current study attempted to test this theory to determine how 
market share and company performance are affected by compliance to BEE. In 
addition – even though it could very well be just a public relations exercise – the 
disclosure of BEE compliance in annual reports of listed companies has improved 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013:134), which means that some companies are adamant to 
be BEE-compliant. 
  43
2.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The literature review revealed how the apartheid system created the inequalities with 
which the new government after 1994 had to deal (see 2.2). The government has 
formally introduced BEE as a policy in 2003 to address these inequalities. The 
objectives of BEE were mainly to incentivise companies to include black people in 
businesses to participate meaningfully in the economy of the country (see 2.4). The 
literature review also reflected the various challenges that came with implementation 
of BEE policies (see 2.6). These challenges included challenges regarding BEE 
policies benefiting only a few people instead of the broader population as intended. 
Other challenges involved difficulties around a lack of legal enforceability of these BEE 
policies and the way various stakeholders resisted BEE. 
The literature review also discussed changes in legislation. With the changes in the B-
BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 and the Codes as discussed (see 2.9), it is going to be more 
challenging to have high B-BBEE compliance in the future. Companies may have to 
spend more money to score high in B-BBEE status levels, which implies that the 
incentive to comply will have to be definite if companies are going to be spending more 
on BEE. The objective of this study was to investigate whether there is an incentive to 
score high in B-BBEE ratings. The next chapter presents the research design and 
methodology for this research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 reported the literature on BEE including its history and evolution. The 
research design and method are outlined in Chapter 3, by presenting the hypotheses 
of this study followed by the methodology that was used when conducting this study. 
The types of variables and the control variable used as part of the data are then 
discussed. Statistical analysis techniques on how secondary data was analysed and 
interpreted together with the sources of secondary data used to test the hypotheses in 
this study are also presented. The data used, the sampling method and the way data 
was analysed in this study are presented. This chapter ends with a discussion of the 
reliability and validity and ethical considerations. 
3.2 HYPOTHESES 
This quantitative study sought to investigate the relationship between BEE scores and 
revenue generation and profitability of the JSE-listed companies. The term ‘hypothesis’ 
is defined by Weathington, Cunningham and Pittenger (2012:42) as a specific 
prediction of a relationship between two variables based on prior knowledge and 
existing theories on the subject. 
Weathington et al. (2012:46) categorise hypotheses into four main types, namely 
estimation of population characteristics, correlation among variables, differences 
among two or more populations, and cause and effect. For purposes of this study, two 
types were used, namely: 
• correlation among variables, where a hierarchal regression analysis on 100 
companies was used; and 
• differences between two groups, where the t-test was used for testing the top 
100 most black-empowered companies against companies that were not among 
the top 100 most black-empowered to determine whether there is a meaningful 
difference between these groups in terms of profitability and revenue growth. 
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The two opposing hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
Alternative hypothesis: JSE-listed companies with high BEE scores benefit more by 
generating more revenue and profits than JSE-listed companies that are not BEE-
compliant. 
Second alternative hypothesis: JSE-listed companies that are BEE-compliant and 
score high on the BEE scorecard have lower revenue growth and profitability than 
companies that are not BEE-compliant. 
Null hypothesis: BEE compliance and scoring high on the BEE scorecard have no 
significant effect on revenue and profitability of JSE-listed companies. 
In order to reject or confirm the null hypothesis, there had to be no statistical difference 
in terms of the revenue growth and profitability of the JSE-listed companies with high 
BEE scores and the JSE-listed companies with low BEE scores. If the null hypothesis 
were rejected, the alternative hypothesis would be accepted. The hypothesis testing 
was non-directional; therefore, a two-tailed test was used in this study (Field 
2013:117). 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
The research method and design outlined the way in which this study was conducted. 
The research design involves a plan or blueprint from which a researcher conducts an 
investigation that provides all the guidelines on how the researcher would collect data 
relevant to what the researcher is attempting to achieve (De Vos, Delport, Fouché & 
Strydom 2011:143; Sachdeva 2009:77). The research design describes what the 
researcher will do with the data collected, and how the data assists in reaching a 
conclusion and in addressing the research problem. Sachdeva (2009:78) explains 
research design further as a tool to structure the research, and shows how all major 
parts of the research come together, including samples, groups, measures, treatments 
and methodology, with the objective of addressing the research question in the study. 
The methodology followed in the current study was quantitative in nature. Quantitative 
research comprises a formal, objective, systematic, empirical investigation in which 
statistical, mathematical or computational techniques are used to obtain information or 
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estimate future events or quantities as they claim (Park & Park 2016:4). Research that 
follows quantitative methods is more advantageous as it is less labour-intensive than 
other methods in terms of analysing data, and a researcher is able to draw conclusions 
on a wide population because big sample sizes can be used (Cameron & Price 
2009:213). Sampling is discussed in section 3.7 below. 
3.3.1 Regression analysis 
This study was a two-part study. The first part of this study comprised testing of the 
relationship between BEE scores and profitability and revenue growth of 100 top black-
empowered JSE-listed companies. This relationship was tested through correlation 
(see 4.3) and hierarchical regression analysis (see 4.3). Correlations are used to 
determine the bi-directional relationship between BEE scores and revenue growth, and 
profitability of these companies. 
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between BEE 
scores, as an independent variable, and revenue growth and profitability, as dependent 
variables (see 3.4). Leverage, market capitalisation, liquidity, and type of industry were 
added as control variables (see 3.5) to strengthen the analysis. The dependent 
variable was the key variable in this case, since it was a variable this study hoped to 
explain, describe and predict as opposed to the independent variable which this study 
hoped would cause or account for the change in the dependent variable (Weathington 
et al. 2012:45). This regression analysis was in a form of: 
 = 	 	+ 	 +			 	+ 	

 	+  	+ 	 	+  
The variables are explained as follows: 
- X1  represents the BEE score of the company; 
- X2  represents the size of the company; 
- X3  represents the leverage of the company; 
- X4  represents the liquidity of the company; 
- X5  represents the industry of the company; and 
- Y represents the revenue growth and profitability of the company. 
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The results of the regression analysis were generated by using the SPSS software 
package and are summarised in the Table 4.4. The value of R square has been 
extracted from the results from SPSS. R² represents coefficient of determination to 
measure the strength of the linear regression. 
To determine the correlation between BEE scores and profitability and revenue growth, 
this study utilised a correlation coefficient to estimate whether there was a linear 
relationship between these variables (Table 4.4). This correlation coefficient indicated 
the degree to which changes in BEE scores corresponded with changes in profitability 
and revenue growth.  
Pearson’s r was used for the correlation coefficient and to measure the strength of the 
linear relationship between BEE scores and profitability and revenue growth (Table 
4.4). A positive correlation coefficient indicated that the variables related positively. As 
BEE scores increased the profitability and revenue growth of the companies increased. 
A negative correlation coefficient indicated that the variables related negatively. As 
BEE scores increased, the profitability and revenue growth of the companies 
decreased. A correlation coefficient of zero implied that there was no relationship 
between the two variables at all, while a correlation coefficient of +1 or -1 meant there 
was a perfect linear relationship between the two variables (Field 2013:137). For the 
purposes of this study a correlation coefficient of between 0.5 and 1 was acceptable 
to indicated that there was a strong relationship between the variables being tested 
(Field 2013:117). 
3.3.2 t-test 
The second part of this study was done using a t-test. A t-test is a statistical test that 
tests whether two means from two groups are statistically different (Polonsky & Waller 
2011:214). JSE-listed companies on the Empowerdex top 100 most black-empowered 
companies were tested against companies that did not fall into the top 100 most black-
empowered companies. A t-test is used widely in social and behavioural studies 
(Weathington et al. 2012:272). This results in the mean of two groups being tested 
using the t-test, which provides a t-statistic, which is tested to see whether it is 
statistically significant or not. The conceptual formula used (Weathington et al. 
2012:272) in this study was: 
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t = 	
Difference	between	group	means
Standard	error	of	the	difference	between	group	means
 
The difference between the two means of the two groups, those that fell among the top 
100 most black-empowered companies and those that did not, was the numerator in 
this case. The denominator in this case, which was the standard error of the difference 
between group means, was used to estimate the variability of scores within these two 
groups. 
3.4 VARIABLES 
Trudel and Cotte (2009:1309) recommend the use of more than one financial 
performance measure when studying relationships due to two main benefits. These 
benefits are mitigation of deficiencies inherent in using only one financial performance 
measure, and that each financial performance measure may reveal completely 
different results, which may assist in interpreting the results (Trudel & Cotte 
2009:1309). The following independent variables were used in this study to determine 
the financial performance of the companies: 
3.4.1 Revenue 
Companies listed on JSE are obliged to apply the IFRS in presenting their annual 
financial statements (Baboukardos & Rimmel 2016). This implies that revenue 
recognised in the annual financial statements of these companies would be as defined 
in International Accounting Standards (IAS) 18, now revised as IFRS 15. The current 
study was done for 2007-2013 when IAS 18 for revenue was applicable. IAS 18 defines 
revenue as “Revenue is income that arises in the course of ordinary activities of an 
entity and is referred to by a variety of different names including sales, fees, interest, 
dividends and royalties” (IASB 1995:1). Besides market capitalisation, total assets and 
number of employees, revenue plays an important role in a company as it is also used 
to measure the size of the company (Wagenhofer 2014).  
Wagenhofer (2014) contends that revenue is one of the most important financial 
performance measures as it provides information on business activities as a whole. 
This is an important measure because it serves as a basis to calculate key 
performance measures, such as gross profit, net income, earnings before interest and 
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tax and other measures. Wüstemann and Kierzek (2005) agree with Wagenhofer 
(2014) on importance of revenue and its usefulness as a measure of performance. 
Investors utilise revenue as part of the decision-making process as they use it to 
evaluate past performance and to predict future cash flows and growth trends of the 
business (Wüstemann & Kierzek 2005; Zhang 2005). Another role of revenue as 
pointed out by Christine and Martiano (2015) is that it is used as one of the benchmarks 
for management performance in running the business as it partly represents results of 
the business operations.  
3.4.2 Profitability measures: Net profit margin and return on equity  
Profitability reflects the achievements and success of the business as it is one of the 
primary goals of most companies (Nuryaman 2013:116). This view is supported by 
Duvenhage and Kruger (2017) who point out that, for profit-driven businesses, profit is 
a key measure of their success. Profitability is seen as a good measure of success of 
the business because it has been observed that companies which attract more 
investments are those with high profitability (Kleynhans & Kruger 2014). As a measure 
of profitability in this study, net profit margin and ROE were used. This is because ROE, 
return on assets (ROA) and net profit margin are traditionally amongst the basic ratios 
that are widely used to evaluate the profitability of companies (Şamiloğlu & Akgün 
2016). The study excluded the ROA as a profitability measure because ROE is highly 
correlated with ROA, and ROE is considered a better profitability measure compared 
to ROA (Raza & Farooq 2017).  
Net profit margin is calculated as a percentage of net profit over revenue. According to 
Totowa (2015:50), net profit margin measures operating efficiency of the company. It 
also represents the ability to create profit for the company (Nuryaman 2013:119). ROE 
is defined as net income as a percentage of shareholders’ equity (Mainul 2012:132). 
According to Monteiro (2006:1), ROE measures the rate at which money invested 
generates profits for the company. ROE is one of the most widely used ratios to 
measure financial performance as it links the income statement (representing financial 
performance) and the balance sheet (representing the financial position of the 
company) (Ahsan 2012:132; Sur, Mitra & Maji 2014:3). Anarfi, Boateng and Adu-
Ababio (2016) also maintain that ROE is one of the key profitability measures that 
evaluates profitability in relation to the company’s book value of its shareholder equity. 
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The current study used ROE as part of the measure of financial performance mainly 
because it is considered the most important ratio to investors since it measures how 
management adds value to the owners of the business (De Wet & Du Toit 2007:60). 
3.5 CONTROL VARIABLES 
The following control variables were used to avoid research bias. 
3.5.1 Size 
Market capitalisation was used to measure the size of the company. As explained by 
Ward and Muller (2010:34), the extent to which companies benefit from BEE varies 
according to the size of the company. Small companies benefit more from being BEE-
compliant by getting an increased turnover and higher margin as high BEE rating gives 
them access to state contracts (Ward & Muller 2010:34).  
Kodongo, Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Maina (2015) agree with the argument that the size 
of the company matters. Small companies rely on greater economic activity to improve 
revenue and profitability. In contrast, with large companies, greater economic activities 
have no significant bearing on the revenue and profitability (Kodongo et al. 2015).  
3.5.2 Leverage 
Leverage, which determines the amount of capital that is financed by debt portion, is 
calculated as a ratio of borrowed funds to total assets (Arranz-Garcia & Vicente-
Lorente 2014:192). As Trudel and Cotte (2009:1310) point out, it is important to use a 
debt ratio as a control variable in financial performance as debt in the company 
influences the behaviour of management in terms of how they explore new 
opportunities. Trudel and Cotte (2009:1310) further point out that debt imposes 
discipline on managers. Both these factors have an influence on the profits of the 
company. Kodongo et al. (2015) further contend that leverage affects profitability of 
companies significantly.  
3.5.3 Liquidity 
Companies with low liquidity tend to perform financially better than companies with 
high liquidity (Martínez‐Ferrero & Frías‐Aceituno 2015:33); hence, liquidity was 
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included as one of the control variables. Liquidity, which determines the ability of the 
company to finance its operations in the short-term, is calculated as a ratio of current 
assets and current liability (Martínez‐Ferrero & Frías‐Aceituno 2015:33). 
3.5.4 Industry type 
Industry type has an influence on financial performance of the companies due to 
cultural traits that are different in various industries (Surroca et al. 2010:473). To 
incorporate industry into this model, a dummy variable was created for the following 
industries: basic materials, consumer goods, customer services, financials, health 
care, industries, technology, and telecommunications. 
3.6 DATA 
A literature review was performed to establish and learn about prior research and 
theories in order to understand the topic being researched. De Vos et al. (2011:134) 
explain that the purpose of a literature review is to contribute to the understanding of 
the nature and meaning of the problem identified in this study. Cameron and Price 
(2009:175) define a literature review as an extensive and critical discussion that brings 
together all the strengths and limitations from different sources. 
The data used in this study came mainly from secondary sources of information. 
According to Cameron and Price (2009:175), secondary data represents facts 
obtained. Cameron and Price (2009:292) further explain that when secondary data is 
used, the researcher has to engage a wide range of sources of literature in order for 
him or her to present a comprehensible case. This is the reason why data was collected 
from various sources, such as published books, journals, publications, reports, 
magazines, Internet searches, and the annual reports of companies. In addition, 
government reports and documents such as the Codes, Government Gazette, policy 
documents, charters and legislation were studied. All the data collected from these 
sources was used as evidence to support the hypotheses as all data used in this study 
was secondary data gathered by others (Cameron & Price 2009:209). 
Information on BEE scores was obtained from the Empowerdex website (Empowerdex 
2015). Empowerdex is a company that performs B-BBEE ratings, and was founded in 
2001 by its current directors Vuyo Jack and Chia-Chao Wu (Empowerdex 2015). Vuyo 
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Jack is co-author of a book called Broad-based BEE: the complete guide (Jack & Harris 
2007) that is used by the University of South Africa (Unisa) and the University of 
Witwatersrand for the B-BBEE Management Development Programme (MDP) (Jack & 
Harris 2007). The MDP is a compulsory requirement for any registered auditor who 
wishes to register with the IRBA as an approved B-BBEE-registered auditor who 
performs B-BBEE compliance audits and issues BEE certificates (Unisa 2017). 
Empowerdex is a leading company in the B-BBEE industry. They were part of the team 
that was involved in developing the Codes for B-BBEE. Other projects Empowerdex 
where was involved are the Department of Communication’s Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector charter, the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism’s tourism sector charter and the Wine and Liquor Industry’s BEE 
industry charter (Empowerdex 2015). 
Data on BEE scores of the top 100 BEE companies are from Empowerdex’s annual 
Financial Times/Empowerdex top empowerment companies survey (Mail & Guardian 
2013). Empowerdex annually compiles a list of the top 100 most black empowerment 
companies. This list ranks the top 100 JSE companies in terms of broad-based BEE. 
This information is published by the Mail & Guardian in April of every year (Mail & 
Guardian 2013). In this Empowerdex survey, participants are invited to submit their 
BEE certificates, which have been verified by verification agencies, accredited by the 
South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) or by an approved B-BBEE 
registered auditor with the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) (Mail & 
Guardian 2013). Independent professionals verify the scores, which adds reliability to 
the scores used. The ratings are based on the financial year preceding the ratings year 
(Van Heerden 2011:22); therefore, 2008 ratings reflect the 2007 financial year, 2011 
ratings reflect the 2010 financial year, and 2014 ratings reflect the 2013 financial year.  
Data relating to revenue and profitability of all JSE-listed companies was obtained from 
the INET BFA database. INET BFA is a leading provider of financial data in Africa, 
such as information on share prices, company information, annual reports, and other 
company financial information. The company has been in existence since 1965 (INET 
BFA 2015). 
Data relating to BEE scores was available only for the top 100 most black-empowered 
companies as Empowerdex only publishes the top 100. It is for this reason that the 
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regression analysis was done only on these top 100 most black-empowered 
companies to test whether there is any significant relationship between the BEE scores 
and profitability and revenue growth. These top 100 most black-empowered 
companies covered all industries. The population tested was limited due to 
unavailability of revenue and profitability data. The companies with this missing 
information were therefore excluded from the test. This resulted in 70 companies for 
2007, 81 companies for 2010, and 77 companies for 2013 being tested. 
For companies that were tested using the independent group t-test, the whole 
population was tested, excluding companies where the profitability and revenue 
information could not be found. Companies on the Empowerdex top 100 empowered 
companies were tested against the companies that did not fall amongst these top 100 
empowered companies. It was assumed that these companies had lower B-BBEE 
scores than the companies among the top 100. 
In this study, a measure for profitability was net profit margin and ROE for the financial 
years ending 2008, 2011 and 2014. This net profit margin (Omnamasivaya & Prasad 
2016:25) was calculated as: 
Net	profit	margin =
Net	profit	for	the	year
Revenue	for	the	year
 
Net profit for the year is net profit before tax, while revenue for the year is total revenue 
as presented in the annual financial statements (Omnamasivaya & Prasad 2016:25). 
ROE (Omnamasivaya & Prasad 2016:25) was calculated as: 
Return	on	Equity =
Net	profit	for	the	year
Shareholders’	equity	
 
3.7 SAMPLING 
This study was done only on JSE-listed companies on the main board. This study 
tested the profitability and revenue change of the year after obtaining the score, 
because if the company would benefit from revenue and profitability increases, this 
would happen in the 12 months following the verification date. It should be noted that 
a B-BBEE certificate is valid for a period of 12 months following the issue date of the 
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certificate (dti 2007). In order to test not only one year, which carries the risk of the 
results of study being biased, the study was spread from the year of introduction of the 
Codes (i.e. 2007) to the year whose data was available at the time of this study (i.e. 
2013). The study was then split into intervals of three years.  
The sample relating to the first part of this study (see 3.3.1) was the top 100 
empowered companies on JSE-listed companies. Regression analysis was performed 
on these companies. The question whether testing 100 companies as a sample is 
appropriate is answered by Cameron and Price (2009:226), who highlight that many 
novice researchers regard 100 as an appropriate number for a sample size. 
The second part of this study (see 3.3.1) entailed testing the top 100 empowered 
companies against the companies that are assumed to have scored lower than the 
companies on the list of top 100 empowered companies. This therefore tested all the 
companies listed on the JSE by comparing those among the top 100 empowered 
companies with those that are not. For 2008, 238 companies were identified, 242 for 
2011, and 253 for 2014. As explained by Cameron and Price (2009:175), a bigger 
sample is always better than a smaller sample in terms of validity of the results; 
therefore, this study tested all companies listed on the JSE on the t-test research. 
Another reason for testing all the listed companies was that this study sought to 
analyse the results beyond a group of companies listed, and to probe further down to 
the industry type and size of the companies. 
Companies that entered or exited the JSE listing during the periods under review were 
excluded to avoid distorting the data. Once the testing on the companies tested had 
been done, generalisation could be done to suggest whether companies with high or 
low B-BBEE scores were more or less profitable and generated more or less revenue. 
3.8 DATA ANALYSIS 
Cameron and Price (2009:468) point out that when association between two variables 
has been tested and found to exist, this association has to be tested whether or not it 
is by chance. This study used the size of the p-value as a measure of level of 
significance of the association. A p-value of less than 5% was considered statistically 
significant. A p-value of less than 5% was used because this is usually found 
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acceptable by various experts as statistically significant (Cameron & Price 2009:469; 
Field 2013:115). 
3.9 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
According to Cameron and Price (2009:215), data is good only if it is “relevant, valid, 
reliable and/or replicable and representative”. Data used, especially if it is secondary 
data, has to be trustworthy data (Cameron & Price 2009:215). Having trustworthy data 
enables the researcher to generalise the conclusions of the data analysis. The B-BBEE 
scores were obtained from the Empowerdex website on information that is publicly 
available. Empowerdex, in association with the Mail & Guardian (previously Financial 
Mail), publishes this information annually in April in the widely read Mail & Guardian 
newspaper. The Empowerdex Top 100 Empowered Companies supplement of the 
Mail & Guardian is a highly respected and widely read publication in the private and 
public sectors (Mathura 2010:36); therefore the information published by them was 
considered to be reliable for purposes of this research. 
As previously noted (see 1.8), data relating to revenue and profitability was obtained 
from the INET BFA database, which is a leading provider of financial data in Africa. 
Since both data sets from the dependent and independent variables were publicly 
available information, the risk of using biased and discrepant information was therefore 
mitigated. 
The data used also had to be valid. Data can be said to be valid if it measures what it 
purports to measure (Cameron & Price 2009:291). “Where secondary data based 
research seeks to compare different organisations, it is vital to ensure that the 
comparable data is available for all the organisations involved” (Cameron & Price 
2009:291). The data on all companies that was tested was available at the time of this 
research. 
3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical issues were taken into consideration to ensure that it was within acceptable 
boundaries and parameters to avoid any harm or negative effect on any party affected. 
When conducting research, it is important for researchers to be sensitive to and mindful 
of moral principles and ethical reasoning by being considerate in terms of the ethical 
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implications of a study, and consequences of one’s actions, doing no harm to others 
and being considerate to the welfare of others (Weathington et al. 2012:24). For the 
purpose of this study, all information used was public information. It was published on 
websites and databases in the public domain; therefore, there was no need to obtain 
any permission from the subjects in this study. However, the providers of information 
are credited for the information provided.  
3.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the nature of this study, the hypotheses, the research design, 
and the method for conducting this study. A two-part study was conducted using 
hierarchical regression analysis and a t-test. BEE scores were tested as an 
independent variable, against the three dependent variables, revenue, net profit 
margin and ROE. This chapter also discussed how size, leverage, liquidity and industry 
were utilised as control variables. This chapter further outlined data utilised, sampling 
size and methods and data analysis techniques. The methodology discussed in this 
chapter was expected to achieve the set goal of this study, which was to establish 
whether there is a significant relationship between BEE scores, revenue growth and 
profitability for JSE-listed companies. The next chapter presents an analysis and 
discussions of the research findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, the research design and method were outlined. This chapter starts by 
outlining the hypotheses of this study followed by the methodology that was followed 
when conducting this study. The types of variables and control variable inputs as part 
of the data are then discussed. Statistical analysis techniques on how secondary data 
was analysed and interpreted together with the sources of secondary data used to test 
the hypotheses in this study are also presented. The data used, sampling method and 
the way data was analysed in this study are presented. The chapter ended by 
discussing the reliability, validity and ethical considerations of the study. 
The research, holistically seen, revolved around probing and validating the efficacy of 
the Codes promulgated by the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, by benefiting BEE-
compliant companies. This chapter contains the findings from the data collected and 
analysed in an attempt to address the research objectives in this study. This chapter 
aims to show the statistical findings that are easy to understand; therefore, various 
approaches have been taken for good and effective visualisation of data in order to 
enhance an understanding of the outcomes. 
The research findings are broadly divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the 
data of the top 100 most black-empowered companies (see 3.3) to interpret the efficacy 
of the BEE framework in terms of its financial benefits to the compliant companies, 
Pearson’s r correlation method along with hierarchical regression modelling was used. 
The aim was to comprehend the relationship between the BEE score (as independent 
variable) and the financial performance variables: revenue growth, net profit margin 
and ROE (as dependent variables). 
The second part (see 3.3) focused on the interpretation of comparative statistics in 
which the two groups, the top 100 most black-empowered companies and companies 
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that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies, are compared in 
order to show differences between the profitability and revenue growth of the 
companies in these groups. To test the hypothesis statistically, a t-test was used which 
compared the means of both groups as base variable. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, BEE score represents the BEE score as provided in the annual 
Empowerdex ranking of the top 100 most black-empowered companies for the 
respective years (see 3.6). Revenue growth represents year-on-year percentage 
growth in revenue of the companies tested (see 1.8). Net profit margin represents the 
annual net profit margin for the financial years being tested (see 3.4.1). ROE 
represents ROE as a measure of profitability of the company (see 3.4.2). Size 
represents market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of each company tested 
(see 3.5.1). Liquidity represents the current ratio of the companies in the respective 
years being tested (see 3.5.3). Leverage factor presents the leverage ratio for the 
financial years being tested (see 3.5.2). A higher BEE score listed as independent 
variable translates into better compliance of the company with the Codes, while a lower 
score postulates lower compliance of the company with the Codes (Van Heerden 
2011:5). Each sample in the three data sets (Tables 4.2 and 4.3) is represented by 
three construct variables: independent variable, financial performance measure and 
control variable. The data is divided into three individual groups depending on the year 
of acquisition of the variables: 2007, 2010 and 2013. 
Table 4.1 provides minimum, maximum, median, mean and standard deviation (SD) of 
all the variables used in this study for 2013. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the descriptive statistics for 2013 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
(SD) 
BEE score 73 48.91 93.98 76.86 74.58 10.32 
Revenue growth 73 -50.00 53.00 9.00 10.10 14.34 
Net profit margin 73 -26.70 48.07 4.97 7.75 10.43 
ROE 73 -46.99 91.41 16.78 17.06 17.90 
Size (millions) 73 38 409 240 12 534 36 773 66 986 
Liquidity 73 0.20 3.17 1.38 1.40 0.57 
Leverage 73 -12.76 26.06 1.33 1.70 3.89 
Source: SPSS results 
From the summary output in Table 4.1, the minimum value for BEE scores was 48.91, 
the median 76.86, the mean 74.58, and the maximum value, 93.98. The mean was 
10.10 for revenue growth, 7.75 for net profit margin, and for ROE, 17.06.  
Table 4.2 provides minimum, maximum, median, mean and SD of all the variables 
used in this study for 2010. 
Table 4.2: Summary of the descriptive statistics for 2010 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Median Mean SD 
BEE score 80 31.00 88.00 66.00 63.03 12.98 
Revenue 
growth 
80 -30.00 59.00 6.00 7.24 14.76 
Net profit 
margin 
80 -44.59 72.49 5.60 9.34 17.01 
ROE 80 -79.08 67.49 16.48 14.00 21.84 
Size (millions) 80 59 270 900 6 191 21 965 47 218 
Liquidity 80 0.22 4.99 1.33 1.47 0.80 
Leverage 80 -34.75 42.56 1.19 1.66 6.75 
Source: SPSS results 
From the summary output in Table 4.2, the minimum score for BEE was 31.0, the 
median was 66.0, the mean 63.03, and the maximum score was 88.0. For revenue 
growth, the minimum score was -30.00, the median 6.00, the mean 7.24, and the 
maximum score, 59.00. For net profit margin, the minimum score was -44.59, the 
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median 5.60, the mean 9.34, and the maximum score, 72.49. The minimum score for 
ROE was -79.08, the median 16.48, the mean 14.00, and the maximum value, 67.49. 
Table 4.3 provides the minimum, maximum, median, mean, and SD of all the variables 
used in this study for 2007. 
Table 4.3: Summary of the descriptive statistics for 2007 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Median Mean SD 
BEE score 70 20.00 73.00 43.50 44.17 14.05 
Revenue growth 70 -16.00 105.00 16.00 20.54 22.56 
Net profit 
margin 
70 -107.54 104.72 7.27 10.34 23.74 
ROE 70 -70.16 384.03 22.84 26.83 49.18 
Size (millions) 70 13 202 680 5 927 17 424 35 131 
Liquidity 70 0.31 10.20 1.30 1.70 1.38 
Leverage 70 -3.85 27.37 1.34 2.89 4.94 
Source: SPSS results 
From the summary output in Table 4.3, the minimum value was 20.0 for the BEE 
scores, the median 43.5, the mean 44.17, and the maximum score was 73.0. The 
minimum value was -16.0 for revenue growth, the median 7.27, the mean 10.34, and 
the maximum value was 104.72. The minimum value was -70.16 for ROE, the median 
22.84, the mean 26.83, and the maximum value, 384.03. 
4.3 CORRELATIONS 
As discussed in section 3.3, a Pearson’s correlation analysis was undertaken to 
determine the correlations between BEE score and financial performance measures: 
revenue growth, net profit margin and ROE. At this stage, this study was only testing 
a bidirectional relationship between two variables at a time. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (r) was used to measure the significance of the correlation. The closer this 
is to zero, the weaker the correlation, and the closer it is to one, the stronger the 
correlation (Field 2013:137). A negative value of Pearson’s r depicts a negative 
relationship between the two variables being tested, meaning the higher the BEE 
score, the lower the financial performance measure with which it is being compared 
(Field 2013:137). A positive value of Pearson’s r depicts a positive relationship 
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between the two variables being tested, meaning the higher the BEE score, the higher 
the financial performance measure with which it is being compared (Field 2013:303). 
Table 4.4 shows a correlation matrix for 2007, 2010 and 2013, and also the correlation 
between BEE scores and financial performance measures: revenue growth, net profit 
margin and ROE. The correlation coefficient, r with a value ranging from 0.5 to 1 or -
0.5 to -1, shows a strong correlation in the variables. It is evident from Table 4.4 below 
that none of the relationships showed significance in any of the three years. The value 
of Pearson’s r is also below the acceptable value of 0.5 of all the variable relationships. 
Table 4.4: Correlation matrix for 2007, 2010, and 2013 
  
Revenue 
growth 
Net profit 
margin 
ROE 
BEE score – 2007 
Pearson’s correlation 0.090 -0.107 -.012 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.436 0.354 0.919 
BEE score – 2010 
Pearson’s correlation 0.000 0.015 0.042 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.998 0.896 0.711 
BEE score – 2013 
Pearson’s correlation 0.086 -0.011 -0.027 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.477 0.925 0.822 
Source: SPSS results 
The correlation coefficients provided insight into the strength and direction (positive or 
negative) of the relationship between BEE scores and the three financial performance 
measures: revenue growth, net profit margin and ROE. However, this study aimed to 
investigate the relationship between BEE scores as independent variable, and revenue 
growth and profitability respectively as dependent variables. In addition, the 
relationship had to be tested by additionally controlling for industry type and other 
relevant financial performance measurements. In order to accomplish this requirement, 
hierarchical regression was used. 
4.4 PART 1: REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The aim of this section, as described earlier, is to describe the relationship between 
BEE score and financial performance measures. A regression analysis was conducted 
on the data to find the relationship and support the alternate hypothesis, namely JSE-
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listed companies with high BEE scores benefit more by generating more revenue and 
profits than JSE-listed companies that are not BEE-compliant.  
The results of the regression analysis were tested for their significance using the p-
value. If the observed p-value is below 0.05, it means that the null hypothesis will be 
rejected (postulating that there exists a significant correlation between the variables) 
and vice versa. 
In order to simplify the results interpretation, a detailed analysis of the complete 
statistical reports of one data set (2013) is elaborated in graphs (Figures 4.1-4.3). The 
graphs show the results of a linear regression carried out by considering the BEE score 
as the independent variable (given on the x-axis) and the dependent variables (net 
profit margin, revenue growth and ROE) (given on the y-axis). Figure 4.1 reflects an 
attempt to carve out the linear regression line relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. As can be extrapolated from Figure 4.2, there is a negative 
trend between BEE score and net profit margin which does not comply with the 
established alternative hypothesis constructed in the light of the literature review. This 
suggests that a higher BEE score will translated into a better profit margin given that 
the BEE score corresponds to BEE compliance. The constructed linear equation for 
the relationship is given as y=-0.1617x + 21.137, whereas the R-squared value is 
0.011. However, the linear regression graph of the BEE score with revenue growth 
(Figure 4.1) shows a slight upward trend, which appears to be in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis, but it was noted that the value of R-squared (R²=0.0008) was 
not significant; hence, showing that the trend cannot be considered a consistent 
interpretation of the alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis is further supported by 
the trend line shown by the graph of the BEE score with ROE (Figure 4.3), as the linear 
regression is slightly negative and there is no consistent correlation of any sort. 
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Figure 4.1: Revenue growth regression graph 2013 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 4.2: Net profit margin regression graph 2013 
Source: Author 
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Figure 4.3: ROE regression graph 2013 
Source: Author 
In order to check the consistency of the correlation and its significance to support the 
alternative hypothesis, a hierarchical regression model was applied to the data using 
SPSS. Firstly, the dependent variable was selected to be revenue growth of the top 
100 most black-empowered companies. The dependent variable was then analysed 
for relationship and its significance using analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing. 
Furthermore, to analyse hidden factors or relationships at play in depth, analysis was 
carried out inducting all constructs using the control variables (market capitalisation, 
liquidity, leverage and industry). The p-values as given in the results (see Tables 4.4-
4.12) were used to define the significance of the relationship constructed. In order to 
reject the null hypothesis, the p-value had to be less than 0.05, which translates into a 
significant correlation. 
4.4.1 Regression results for 2013 
Below are the results of the regression analysis, which are presented by year. The 
results are presented starting with revenue growth, followed by net profit margin, and 
ROE as dependent variables for 2013. 
4.4.1.1 Revenue growth as dependent variable – 2013 
The results of the regression analysis were generated by the software SPSS and are 
summarised in the Table 4.5. The value of R2 was extracted from the results from 
y = -0.1026x + 27.22
R² = 0.0008
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SPSS. R2 represents the coefficient of determination, which is used to measure the 
strength of the linear regression. 
For the purpose of this study, hierarchical regression modelling was used. For the first 
model, the dependent variable was revenue growth with the BEE score as the 
independent variable. The result of the F-test as shown in Table 4.5, indicated that this 
statistical model was not statistically significant as its p-value was greater than 0.05 
(F=0.613; p=0.436). Although the results show that there was a positive relationship 
between revenue and the BEE score (see Table 4.5), with a standardised beta 
coefficient value of 0.090, the relationship between these variables was not statistically 
significant. R2, which in this case measured the percentage change of financial 
performance movements that can be explained by movements in BEE scores, was 
also very low. R2 for model one was 0.008, which implied that less than 1% of the 
movement in revenue growth could be explained by movements in BEE scores. 
For the second model (see Table 4.5), the predictors liquidity, leverage and market 
capitalisation were added to the regression. Again, the results of the F-test show that 
this statistical model was not statistically significant as the p-value was above 0.05 
(F=1.812; p=0.136). Consistent with model one, the results of R2 did not improve 
significantly for model two as the value was 0.091, which means only 9% of the 
movement in revenue growth could be explained by movements in BEE score. Again, 
the results show that there was a positive relationship between revenue and BEE 
score. With a standardised beta coefficient value of 0.078, the relationship between 
these variables was not statistically significant. 
All other constant variables were added in the third model. The results of the F-test are 
consistent with the first and second models, which showed a similar trend that the 
statistical model was not significant as the p-value was greater than 0.05 (F=1.493; 
p=0.176). There was a slight improvement with R2 for model three (R2=0.149), however 
it remained insignificant. This means only 15% of the movement in revenue growth 
could be explained by movements in BEE score. The results are still showing a positive 
relationship between revenue and BEE score with a standardised beta coefficient 
value of 0.052; however, the relationship between these variables is still not statistically 
significant. Therefore, in this case, the null hypothesis could not be rejected and was 
accepted as the outcome for the relationship between the BEE score and revenue 
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growth of the top 100 most black-empowered companies considering the results of all 
three models. 
Table 4.5: Regression results for 2013 with revenue growth as dependent 
variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score .090 .078. .052 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 -.032 
.216 
.195 
.014 
.200 
.223 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  -.231 
.008 
-.028 
.054 
R² .008 .091 .149 
F (p-value) .613 (.436) 1.812 (.136) 1.493 (.176) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.1.2 Net profit margin as dependent variable – 2013 
Table 4.6 shows the standardised coefficients for the dependent variable net profit 
margin. The standardised coefficient for the first model with BEE score as the 
independent variable was -0.107 which showed a negative relationship; however, the 
results demonstrate an insignificant relationship due to the p-value which is less than 
0.05 (p=0.354). R2 was also very low at 0.011, which implied that only 1.1% of 
variations in net profit margin could be explained by changes in BEE scores. The 
results are also confirmed by the result of the F-test as shown in Table 4.6, namely 
that this statistical model was found to be not significant as its p-value was less than 
0.05 (F=0.870; p=0.354). 
Models two and three had F-test results that showed significant statistical models 
(F=2.895; p=0.028) and F=5.129 (p=0.000). Despite the significant F-test results, there 
was no significance with the p-values for the standardised coefficients for both models 
two and three, the p-values were below 0.05 (p=0.244 for model two and p=0.148 for 
model three). R2 for both models two and three also supported the conclusion at 
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R2=0.139 and R2=0.376. With revenue growth, the null hypothesis relating to net profit 
margin could not be rejected. 
Table 4.6: Regression results for 2013 with net profit margin as dependent 
variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score -.107 -.129 -.144 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 -.193 
.238 
.223 
-.052 
.357 
.207 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  .025 
.059 
.541 
.014 
R² .011 .139 .376 
F (p-value)  .870 (.354) 2.895 (.028) 5.129 (.000) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.1.3 ROE as dependent variable – 2013 
The results for the regression analysis conducted on the data for 2013 with ROE added 
as a dependent variable are shown in Table 4.7. The results for the ROE are slightly 
different from the results of the other financial performance measures in that the F-test 
results show a significance in the statistical model for model two (p=000) and model 
three (p=000). Only the F-test results of model one show results that are not significant 
for the statistical model as p-value was above 0.05 (p=0.919). R2 for model two 
(R2=0.564) and model three (R2=0.590) was also very high, which implies that a high 
percentage (over 50% for both models) of the variation in ROE can be explained by 
the changes in the set of variables in each of those models. Although the F-test and 
R2 results are significant, the results of the standardised coefficient with its associated 
significance indicate that the relationship between ROE and the three models is not 
significant with p-values for model one (p=0.919), two (p=0.782) and three (p=0.867) 
being above 0.05. Therefore, it is evident that the BEE score was not a statistically 
significant predictor of ROE in 2013 results. 
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Table 4.7: Regression results for 2013 with ROE as dependent variable 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.2 Regression results for 2010 
Below are the results of the regression analysis presented by year. The results are 
presented starting with revenue growth, followed by net profit margin and ROE as 
dependent variables for 2010. 
4.4.2.1 Revenue growth as dependent variable – 2010 
The 2010 hierarchical regression modelling (Table 4.8) show similar results as for 
2013, as follows. For the first model, the dependent variable was revenue growth with 
the BEE score as the independent variable. The result of the F-test as shown in Table 
4.8 below, indicated that this statistical model was not statistically significant as its p-
value was greater than 0.05 (F=0.000; p=0.998). 
Although the results show that there was a positive relationship between revenue and 
BEE score (see Table 4.8), with a standardised beta coefficient value of 0.000, the 
relationship between these variables was not statistically significant. R2, which in this 
case, measured the percentage change in financial performance movements that can 
be explained by movements in BEE scores, was also very low. R2 for model one was 
0.000, which implies that none of movements in revenue growth could be explained by 
movements in BEE scores. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score -.012 -.022 -.013 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 -.027 
-.748 
.002 
.035 
-.728 
.017 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  .004 
.141 
.165 
.074 
R² .000 .564 .590 
F (p-value) .010 (.919) 23.288 (.000) 12.236 (.000) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
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For the second model (see Table 4.8 below), the predictors liquidity, leverage and 
market capitalisation were added to the regression. Again, the results of the F-test as 
shown in Table 4.8, show that this statistical model was not statistically significant as 
the p-value was above 0.05 (F=1.251; p=0.297). Consistent with model one, the results 
of R² do not show a significant improvement for model two as the value was 0.062, 
which means only 6% of movement in revenue growth could be explained by 
movements in BEE score. Again, the results show that there was a positive relationship 
between revenue and BEE score (see Table 4.8). With a standardised beta coefficient 
value of 0.051, the relationship between these variables was not statistically significant. 
All other constant variables were added in the third model. The results of the F-test 
were consistent with the first and second model, which showed a similar trend to this 
model in that the statistical model was not significant as the p-value is greater than 
0.05 (F=1.054; p=0.405). The R² for model three (R²=0.105) was also low and 
remained insignificant. This means only 10% of the movement in revenue growth could 
be explained by movements in BEE score after including all variables. The results still 
showed a positive relationship between revenue and BEE score with a standardised 
beta coefficient value of 0.038; however, the relationship between these variables was 
not statistically significant. Therefore, in this case, the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected and was accepted as the outcome for the relationship between the BEE score 
and revenue growth of the top 100 most black-empowered companies, considering the 
results of all three models. 
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Table 4.8: Regression results for 2010 with revenue growth as dependent 
variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score .000 .051 .038 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 .096 
-.176 
.136 
.138 
-.136 
.117 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  .013 
.061 
.140 
-.118 
R² .000 .062 .105 
F (p-value)  .000 (.998) 1.251 (.297) 1.054 (.405) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.2.2 Net profit margin as dependent variable – 2010 
Table 4.9 shows the standardised coefficients for the dependent variable net profit 
margin. The standardised coefficient for the first model with BEE score as the 
independent variable was 0.015, which showed a positive relationship; however, the 
results demonstrated an insignificant relationship as the p-value was less than 0.05 
(p=0.896). R² was also very low at 0.000, which implied that none of variations in net 
profit margin could be explained by changes in BEE scores. These results are 
confirmed by the result of the F-test as shown in Table 4.8, namely that this statistical 
model was found to be not significant as its p-value was less than 0.05 (F=0.017; 
p=0.896). Model two showed similar results with F-test results of F =2.467 and 
p=0.052. 
Model three had F-test results that showed a significant statistical model (F=3.917; 
p=0.001). Despite the significant F-test results, there was no significance with the p-
values for the standardised coefficients as the p-value was below 0.05 (p=0.812). R² 
for model three also supported the conclusion at 0.303. With revenue growth, the null 
hypothesis relating to net profit margin could not be rejected. 
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Table 4.9: Regression results for 2010 with net profit margin as dependent 
variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score .015 .057 .024 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 .271 
-.013 
.185 
.394 
.044 
.194 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  -.054 
.091 
.420 
-.079 
R² .000 .115 .303 
F (p-value)  .017 (.896) 2.467 (.052) 3.917 (.001) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented.*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.2.3 ROE as dependent variable – 2010 
The results for the regression analysis conducted on the data for 2010 with ROE added 
as a dependent variable are shown in Table 4.10. The results for the F-test results 
showed a significance in the statistical model for model three (p=0.038), and no 
significance for model one (p=0.711) and model two (p=0.367). R² for all three models 
was low, with model one at (R-square=0.002), model two at (R-square=0.054) and 
model three at (R-square=0.196). This implies that for the three models, less than 20% 
of the variation in ROE could be explained by the variation in BEE scores. Although 
the F-test results for model three were significant, the results of the standardised 
coefficient with its associated significance indicated that the relationship between ROE 
and model three variables was not significant with a p-value of less than 0.05 
(p=0.769). Therefore, it was evident that the BEE score was not a statistically 
significant predictor of ROE in the 2010 results. 
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Table 4.10: Regression results for 2010 with ROE as dependent variable 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.3 Regression results for 2007 
Below are the results of the regression analysis, which are presented by year. The 
results are presented starting with revenue growth, followed be net profit margin, and 
ROE as dependent variables for 2007. 
4.4.3.1 Revenue growth as dependent variable – 2007 
Table 4.11 demonstrates the results of the 2007 hierarchical regression modelling. The 
result of the F-test as shown in Table 4.11 indicated that all three statistical models 
were not statistically significant as its p-values were greater than 0.05. The F-test 
results are (F=0.512, (p=0.477)) for model one, (F=0.503, (p=0.734)) for model two, 
and (F=0.576, (p=0.840)) for model three. 
With the 2013 and 2010 results – although the results show that there is a positive 
relationship between revenue and BEE score from Table 4.11, with a standardised 
beta coefficient values of 0.086, 0.079 and 0.093 for model one, two and three 
respectively – the relationships between these variables are not statistically significant, 
as p-values for all three models are more than 0.05. R² for all three models, are also 
very low. R² for model one is 0.007, 0.030 for model two and 0.098 for model three. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score .042 .081 .032 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 .102 
-.089 
.175 
.207 
-.023 
.152 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  -.112 
.243 
.091 
-.218 
R² .002 .054 .196 
F (p-value)  .138 (.711) 1.092 (.367) 2.189 (.038) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
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This implies that movements in BEE scores for all three models can explain less than 
10% of movements in revenue growth. 
Table 4.11: Regression results for 2007 with revenue growth as dependent 
variable 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.3.2 Net profit margin as dependent variable 2007 
Table 4.12 demonstrates the results of the 2007 hierarchical regression modelling for 
net profit. The result of the F-test as shown in Table 4.12, indicated that all three 
statistical models were not statistically significant as its p-values were greater than 
0.05. The F-test results are (F=0.009, (p=0.925)) for model one, (F=2.272, (p=0.071)) 
for model two, and (F=1.214, (p=0.306)) for model three. 
The standardised beta coefficient values are -0.011, 0.004 and 0.037 for model one, 
two and three respectively. The relationships between these variables are not 
statistically significant as p-values for all three models are more than 0.05. R² for all 
three models, are also very low. R² for model one is 0.000, 0.123 for model two and 
0.137 for model three. This implies that movements in BEE scores for all three models 
can explain less than 14% of movements in revenue growth. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score .086 .079 .093 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 -.004 
-.098 
.110 
.021 
-.055 
.053 
Technical industry  
Industrial industry 
Financial industry’ 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Consumer goods industry 
Health care industry 
  -.076 
.107 
-.042* 
.175 
-.054 
.062 
.129 
R² .007 .030 .098 
F (p-value)  .512 (.477) .503 (.734) .576 (.840) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
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Table 4.12: Regression results for 2007 with net profit margin as dependent 
variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score -.011 .004 .037 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 .351 
.056 
.095 
.371 
.071 
.103 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  .089 
.107 
.028 
.139 
R² .000 .123 .137 
F (p-value)  .009 (.925) 2.272 (.071) 1.214 (.306) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Source: SPSS results 
4.4.3.3 ROE as dependent variable 2007 
Table 4.13 demonstrates the results of the 2007 hierarchical regression modelling for 
ROE. The result of the F-test as shown in Table 4.13, indicated that statistical models 
were not statistically significant for model one and as its p-values were greater than 
0.05. The F-test results for these two models are (F=0.051, (p=0.822)) for model one, 
(F=1.312, (p=0.275)) for model two. F-test results for model three was significant 
(F=2.125, (p=0.047)). 
The standardised beta coefficient values are -0.027, -0.031 and 0.003 for model one, 
two and three respectively. The relationships between these variables are not 
statistically significant as p-values for all three models are more than 0.05. R² for all 
three models, are also very low. R² for model one is 0.001, 0.075 for model two and 
0.218 for model three. This implies that movements in BEE scores for all three models 
can explain less than 22% of movements in revenue growth. 
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Table 4.13: Regression results for 2007 with ROE as dependent variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
BEE score -.027 -.031 .003 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Market capitalisation 
 .012 
.265 
-.056 
.012 
.358 
-.022 
Basic materials industry 
Consumer services industry 
Financial industry 
Industrial industry 
  -.041 
.253 
-.239 
.011 
R² .001 .075 .218 
F (p-value)  .051 (.822) 1.312 (.275) 2.125 (.047) 
Note: Standardised beta coefficients are presented. *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Source: SPSS results 
After the regression analysis of the three datasets (2007, 2010 and 2013), it could be 
concluded that the alternative hypothesis (JSE-listed companies with high BEE scores 
benefit more by generating more revenue than JSE-listed companies that are not BEE-
compliant, and score low on the BEE scorecard) can be safely rejected, since there 
was no strong correlation found in the results. This finding indicated that the null 
hypothesis had to be accepted (stating that the financial performance of the company 
does not depend on its BEE score). 
4.5 PART 2: T-TEST – COMPARISON OF TWO GROUPS 
The objective of this test was to determine whether statistically significant differences 
existed between the financial performance of the companies that were among the top 
100 black-empowered companies at the time and companies that were not among the 
top 100 most black-empowered companies at the time. 
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between average financial performance variables of 
top 100 most black-empowered companies and non-top 100 most 
black-empowered companies 
Source: Author 
The line chart in Figure 4.4 describes the dataset in terms of the two groups that were 
studied (top 100 most black-empowered companies and non-top 100 most black-
empowered companies). The graph shows the average values of financial 
performance measures corresponding to the companies of the two groups. It further 
shows that the top 100 most black-empowered companies had lower net profit margins 
and revenue growth on average as compared to the others. On the other hand, the 
ROE was significantly higher. It can be concluded from the graph that BEE compliance 
results in higher ROE; however, the compliance reduces profit margins and revenue 
growth. In order to obtain conclusive results, a detailed statistical analysis on the 
cleaned data was conducted, as reported in sections 4.5.1-4.5.3. 
The hypothesis that was tested was: 
JSE-listed companies with high BEE scores benefit more by generating more 
revenue and profits than JSE-listed companies that are not BEE-compliant.  
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During the second part of this study, the above hypothesis was tested by attempting 
to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in financial 
performance between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and companies 
that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. To give a general 
idea of the difference between the means of the two groups (top 100 and non-top 100), 
the grouped column chart (Figure 4.5) demonstrates the comparison comprehensively. 
In the chart, the average values of the measure of financial performance of both the 
groups are compared from a single perspective, and interesting trends are visualised. 
The chart aims to capture the essence of the t-test, which is otherwise hard to visualise. 
Although it was evident that there existed a significant difference of means in the 
financial performance measures, the statistical significance could only be established 
using the t-test. 
 
Figure 4.5: Group chart showing differences between average financial 
performance variables of BEE top 100 companies with non-BEE 
top 100 companies group 
Source: Author 
According to the alternative hypothesis, a significant difference existed in the means 
of the two groups compared. If the significant difference between the two groups 
cannot be established, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
  78
The t-test was conducted for each dataset (2007, 2010 and 2013) using SPSS, and 
the results are given in the standard tabular form in Tables 4.13-4.18. A 5% level of 
significance was used. The following measures for financial performance were used: 
revenue growth, net profit margin, and ROE for 2007, 2010 and 2013. 
The results from the 2007 group and construct from them were examined to set the 
base for the following years. The group statistics (see Table 4.13) enumerate the 
difference in mean for all the variables used in the test for the two groups along with 
other characteristics of the distribution. However, to check the significance of the test 
results, in order to probe whether the difference was deducted through chance or if the 
whole population was showing the same difference, we needed to test the results at 
two levels. First, the difference in variance of the two groups was measured to decide 
which type of test had to be conducted, e.g. equal variance assumed or equal variance 
not assumed. In the results (see Table 4.14), the independent samples test, two 
different test results can be deduced: firstly, the one where equal variance is assumed, 
and secondly, where equal variance is not assumed. For equal variance to be 
assumed, the significance (p-value) should be above 0.05. As it can be seen from 
Table 4.14, the significance for the revenue growth distribution in terms of equal 
variance assumed was below 0.05, which means equal variance could not be 
assumed, while for other variables, the p-value was above 0.05, showing that equal 
variances could be assumed. 
After deciding on the type of variances assumed, the significance of the deducted 
difference in mean was extrapolated as demonstrated. This significance value 
corresponded to the column ‘sig. (2-tailed)’ of Table 4.14. This significance value was 
tested as corresponding to the type of variance used. 
4.5.1 T-test results for 2007 
For revenue growth, the null hypothesis of equal variances assumed was rejected 
(p < 0.05) and we could thus not assume equal variances because the variances were 
significantly different. The t-test results (Table 4.15) indicated that with regard to 
revenue growth at the 5% level of significance, no statistically significant difference 
(p=0.100) existed between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
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For net profit margin, the null hypothesis of equal variances assumed could not be 
rejected (p > 0.05) and we could thus assume equal variances because the variances 
were not significantly different. The t-test results (Table 4.15) indicated that with regard 
to net profit margin at the 5% level of significance, no statistically significant difference 
(p=0.917) existed between the top 100 most black-empowered companies, and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
For ROE, the null hypothesis of equal variances assumed could not be rejected 
(p > 0.05) and we could thus assume equal variances because the variances were not 
significantly different. The t-test results (Table 4.15) indicated that with regard to ROE 
at the 5% level of significance, no statistically significant difference (p=0.259) existed 
between the top 100 black-empowered companies and companies that were not 
among the top 100 black-empowered companies. 
Table 4.14: Mean performance values per group of companies for 2007 
Performance measure Group N Mean SD 
Revenue growth Top 100 70 20.543 22.5605 
Non-top 100 173 29.549 62.2376 
Net profit margin Top 100 70 10.282 23.5722 
Non-top 100 173 5.974 346.0947 
ROE Top 100 70 26.830 49.1829 
Non-top 100 173 12.659 99.9846 
Source: SPSS results 
Table 4.15: Results of the t-test 2007 
 
Levene’s test for 
equality of 
variances 
t-test for equality of means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
Revenue 
growth 
Equal variances assumed 9.557 .002 -1.179 241 .240 
Equal variances not assumed   -1.654 239.017 .100 
Net profit 
margin 
Equal variances assumed 1.384 .241 .104 241 .917 
Equal variances not assumed   .163 175.909 .871 
ROE Equal variances assumed .234 .629 1.131 241 .259 
Equal variances not assumed   1.475 232.216 .142 
Source: SPSS results 
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4.5.2 T-test results for 2010 
The same analysis for t-test interpretation was conducted on the dataset for 2010. The 
results below show that the null hypothesis of equal variances assumed could not be 
rejected (p > 0.05) and we could thus assume equal variances because the variances 
were not significantly different. This analysis is applicable to revenue growth, net profit 
margin and ROE. 
For revenue growth, the t-test results (Table 4.17) indicated that no statistically 
significant difference (p=0.196) with regard to revenue growth at the 5% level of 
significance existed between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
For net profit margin, the t-test results (Table 4.17) indicated that no statistically 
significant difference (p=0.582) with regard to net profit margin at the 5% level of 
significance existed between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
For ROE, the t-test results (Table 4.17) indicated that no statistically significant 
difference (p=0.997) with regard to ROE at the 5% level of significance existed 
between the top 100 black-empowered companies and companies that were not 
among the top 100 black-empowered companies. 
Table 4.16: Mean performance values per group of companies for 2010 
Performance measure Group N Mean SD 
Revenue growth Top 100 81 6.914 14.9543 
Non-top 100 173 36.723 206.6786 
Net profit margin Top 100 81 9.1931 16.95594 
Non-top 100 173 101.5440 1505.16538 
ROE Top 100 81 13.7009 21.86706 
Non-top 100 173 13.4421 647.83808 
Source: SPSS results 
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Table 4.17: Results of the t-test 2010 
 
Levene’s test 
for equality of 
variances 
t-test for equality of means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
Revenue 
growth 
Equal variances assumed 3.758 .054 -1.295 252 .196 
Equal variances not assumed   -1.887 175.821 .061 
Net profit 
margin 
Equal variances assumed 2.578 .110 -.552 252 .582 
Equal variances not assumed   -.807 172.093 .421 
ROE Equal variances assumed 1.187 .277 .004 252 .997 
Equal variances not assumed   .005 172.836 .996 
Source: SPSS results 
4.5.3 T-test results for 2013 
The same analysis for t-test interpretation was conducted on the dataset for 2013. The 
results below (Table 4.19) show that equal variances could not be assumed for 
revenue growth and net profit margin, as both their p-values for the equal variance test 
were below 0.05 (p=0.015 for revenue growth and p=0.000 for net profit margin). For 
ROE, equal variance could be assumed as p-value was more than 0.05 (p=0.059). 
For revenue growth, the t-test results (Table 4.19) indicated that a statistically 
significant difference (p=0.040) with regard to revenue growth at the 5% level of 
significance existed between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
For net profit margin, the t-test results (Table 4.19) indicated that a statistically 
significant difference (p=0.007) with regard to net profit margin at the 5% level of 
significance existed between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
For ROE, the t-test results (Table 4.19) indicated that no statistically significant 
difference (p=0.116) with regard to ROE at the 5% level of significance existed 
between the top 100 most black-empowered companies and companies that were not 
among the top 100 most black-empowered companies. 
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Out of the three dependent variables, revenue growth and net profit margin showed 
significance for 2-tailed results, which had p-values of 0.040 and 0.007 respectively 
(which were below 0.05). The results (Table 4.18) show that the difference in means 
of the variable revenue growth was significant with a mean difference of  
-27.943 (9.429 - 37.372). The results also show a significant difference in means for 
net profit margin with a mean difference of -10.889 (9.097 - 19.986). 
Table 4.18: Mean performance values per group of companies for 2013 
Performance measure Group N Mean SD 
Revenue growth Top 100 77 9.429 14.532 
Non-top 100 156 37.372 167.465 
Net profit margin Top 100 77 9.097 15.925 
Non-top 100 156 19.986 44.339 
ROE Top 100 77 23.202 94.468 
Non-Top 100 156 10.848 18.528 
Source: SPSS results 
Table 4.19: Results of the t-test 2013 
 
Levene’s test 
for equality of 
variances 
t-test for equality of means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
Revenue 
growth 
Equal variances assumed 6.058 .015 -1.460 231 .146 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.068 159.689 .040 
Net profit 
margin 
Equal variances assumed 16.192 .000 -2.088 231 .038 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.731 216.452 .007 
ROE Equal variances assumed 3.589 .059 1.576 231 .116 
Equal variances not assumed   1.137 78.900 .259 
Source: SPSS results 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The two-part model comprising regression analysis (see 4.4) and t-test (see 4.5) was 
used with the aim to determine whether there was a relationship between financial 
performance and the BEE score of the JSE-listed companies. The analysis started with 
the results of the regression analysis where three financial measures, revenue growth, 
net profit margin and ROE were tested against the BEE scores as reflected in Tables 
4.5.1-4.5.3. Although the regression analysis results showed a significant relationship 
with p-values of below 0.05 for both ROE and net profit margin for both 2013 and 2010, 
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the correlation coefficient of those relationships was way below 0.5, which implied an 
extremely weak correlation between the variables. Concerning revenue growth, its 
relationship with the BEE score was found to be not significant for the relevant years 
tested. With these results, the null hypothesis could therefore not be rejected. This 
implied that this study could not conclude that there is a strong relationship between 
BEE scores and financial performance for companies listed on the JSE based on 
regression results. 
It was evident from the results of the t-test as presented in sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 
4.5.3, that in 2007 and 2010, there proved to be no relationship at all between all the 
financial performance measures and BEE scores. This is because all the p-values 
were below 0.05. What needs to be highlighted, however, is that in later years – in this 
case, 2013 – a significant relationship between the two financial performance 
measures, revenue growth and net profit margin, and BEE score was determined. The 
p-values for these two measures were below 0.05. The t-test results however showed 
a negative relationship. The results showed that companies that were not among the 
top 100 most black-empowered companies performed better concerning revenue 
growth and net profit margin. The next chapter presents the conclusions of this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter contained the results of the analyses and discussions on the 
research findings. In this chapter, the summary, conclusions and recommendations for 
further studies are outlined. This chapter starts with an overview of this study to discuss 
the background of the study. The overview is followed by conclusions argued 
inductively and deductively, followed by a discussion of how this study affects the B-
BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 objectives as set out in the first chapter (see 1.6). Finally, 
conclusions and recommendations of possible future studies are discussed. 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF THIS STUDY 
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 was 
promulgated to address the economic differences, which were caused by policies of 
the previous apartheid government. The B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 was set to 
achieve various objectives with the main aim of improving black people’s lives and 
increasing their participation in the mainstream economy of the country. The B-BBEE 
Act, No. 53 of 2003 empowered the Minister of Trade and Industry to issue the Codes, 
aimed to incentivise companies to include black people in their economic activities. 
The incentives refer to means of preferential procurement and other dealings with the 
state and state entities. The aim of these incentives was to reward companies: the 
more such companies comply, the more advantage they would gain over other 
companies. The research question this study raised, was whether these incentives 
were significant enough to affect the financial performance of companies that 
participate in terms of BEE compliance. 
In Chapter 2, an argument was presented that the more companies participated in 
BEE, the more the whole country would benefit economically, and for companies to 
participate meaningfully in BEE compliance, they would somehow have to benefit 
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financially. This study sought to test that financial benefit. The alternative hypothesis 
was constructed around the relationship between the BEE score and financial 
performance of companies listed on the JSE. (JSE-listed companies with high BEE 
scores benefit more by generating more revenue and profits than JSE-listed 
companies that are not BEE-compliant.) 
In order to construct the premise and test the hypothesis fully, the results and analysis 
in Chapter 4 probed deep into the data using multiple statistical inferences. The results 
section capitalised on an inductive approach first, in order to demonstrate possible 
trends using exploratory data analysis for both datasets: the top 100 most black-
empowered companies and the non-top 100 most black-empowered companies. The 
inductive approach was further aided with a deductive analysis for testing the 
hypothesis in the light of available literature and intelligent speculations. 
In an attempt to comprehend the dynamics of both data sets, multiple inferential 
techniques were employed to spot hidden trends, using subsets within the acquired 
raw datasets. The aim was to exploit trends that might undermine the process of 
hypothesis probing in the deductive statistical test results. Below, the conclusion starts 
with the inductive analysis. 
5.3 INDUCTIVE ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
The first part of the analysis focused on the top 100 most black-empowered 
companies. It was analysed using exploratory analysis, and it was found that there was 
no linear trend regarding the relationship of the BEE score and the three measures of 
financial performance: net profit margin, revenue growth and ROE. The BEE score, as 
established in the literature review, is a measure of the extent of compliance of 
companies towards the Codes promulgated in the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003, and 
announced by government in 2007 and 2013. Hence, a higher BEE score represents 
a higher compliance of a corporate company with the guidelines of the B-BBEE Act, 
No. 53 of 2003 and the Codes. The aim of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 is to 
construct an amiable environment for the companies to adapt to the practices of black 
economic involvement in the mainstream market. We refer to previous chapters where 
the three imperatives of BEE were outlined by Jack and Harris (2007). These were 
firstly, moral issues referring to correcting racial imbalances; secondly, social issues, 
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referring to the racial wealth divide; and thirdly, the economic growth issue referring to 
addressing the economic issues of previously disadvantaged groups. 
The first two aspects of BEE could not be measured empirically, so any empirical and 
data-based findings were limited to the third imperative, which encapsulated the 
economic aspects of BEE compliance. As the inferential data analysis showed in the 
first part of the findings for the dependence of financial performance of a company on 
its BEE score, it was clearly established that there was no correlation between the two 
quantities, which showed that, from an inferential point of view and using compounded 
data, the null hypothesis could not be eliminated. Hence, the results showed that the 
Codes might be inadequate and inefficient in enhancing the financial performance of a 
company on its own. On the other hand, it was found in the literature that the aims of 
introducing BEE policies are not solely concentrated on improving the financial 
performance of a company. The main aim of the practices is to establish economic 
prosperity by helping black people and making a viable economic environment for their 
growth and participation. 
A multifaceted conclusion could be drawn from the initial inferential findings. Firstly, 
the efficacy of designed Codes is low in extending the financial performance of a 
compliant company. Secondly, the extent of compliance, measured as the BEE score, 
is based upon the social and moral influences a company creates in its internal and 
external environment. Thirdly, it appears that the evidence of advantages to a company 
of the compliance with Codes and the scoring index is not conclusive. 
As noted in the literature review, the Strategy for B-BBEE clarifies that a measure of 
success for BEE implementation is evaluated against a significant increase in the 
following: 
• black people who own and control new and existing enterprises; 
• the number of new black enterprises; 
• black-empowered enterprises; 
• black-engendered enterprises; 
• black executives in enterprises; 
• black senior managers in enterprises; 
• community broad-based enterprises and cooperatives; 
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• black ownership of land and other productive assets; 
• improved access to infrastructure by black people; 
• acquisition of skills by black people; and 
• participation in productive economic activities by black people (dti 2003c). 
The stated BEE compliance criteria show that if a company completely complies with 
the Codes, it does not solely increase its financial value, but the focus is also on 
introducing a soft image and being more socially responsible by reflecting their 
eagerness to be a part of a social and economic campaign. The availability of empirical 
data on the other hand was restricted to the extent of financial growth of a company 
and its financial performance in a year. Hence, an inductive inference could be made 
that, given that the Codes are aimed at accentuating the moral and social character of 
a company, it is not viable to comprehend the positive influences of BEE compliance 
solely through financial performance. 
The constructed predicament in favour of the null hypothesis was elaborated through 
the comparison of the two data sets: the top 100 most black-empowered companies 
and the non-top 100 most black-empowered companies. The exploratory data analysis 
showed no consistent inverse correlation between the two sets of companies. In light 
of the constructed alternative hypothesis, it was speculated that the BEE-compliant 
companies will outrun the non-BEE-compliant companies in terms of financial 
performance, but the inferential analysis showed a darker picture. ROE for BEE-
compliant companies was considerably higher than for non-compliant companies; 
however, this finding could not be declared conclusive due to statistical insignificance 
(see 3.6). On the other hand, the non-compliant companies had much higher net profit 
margins and revenue growth compared to the compliant companies. As established in 
the previous chapter (see 4.5.3), this could not be conclusive as there was statistical 
significance only in 2013. This could indicate that BEE compliance turns to be a costly 
exercise that does not necessarily translate into profits. Alternatively, this could 
indicate that the costs of BEE compliance outweigh the benefits of compliance in terms 
of financial performance. The deductive analysis conclusion follows. 
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5.4 DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
The first part of the data analysis (see 4.4) focused on the data of the top 100 most 
black-empowered listed companies. To interpret the efficacy of the BEE framework, in 
terms of its financial benefits to the compliant companies, Pearson’s R regression 
method along with linear regression analysis was used. The aim was to comprehend 
the relationship between the BEE score and the financial performance variables: net 
profit margin, ROE and revenue growth. 
The second part of data analysis (see 4.5) focused on the interpretation of comparative 
statistics in which the two groups: the top 100 most black-empowered companies and 
companies that were not among the top 100 most black-empowered companies, were 
compared in order to establish differences between profitability and revenue growth of 
the companies in the groups. To test the hypothesis statistically, the t-test was used, 
which compared the means of both groups as base variable. 
The deductive analysis was designed to test the data in two distinct ways in order to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis. The focus of the first deductive test was to 
demonstrate the regression between financial performance indicators of the company: 
net profit margin, revenue growth and ROE. An alternative hypothesis was constructed 
in the light of the literature, which stated that BEE scores are a predictor of company 
performance; hence, a company with a better BEE score should have better financial 
performance. The aim here was to test the efficacy and eligibility of BEE guidelines 
and the Codes in promulgating company performance. Stakeholder interest was also 
served by providing vital information about a company based on its BEE score. 
5.4.1 Regression analysis of top 100 most empowered black-owned companies 
According to the results of the regression analysis illustrated in Chapter 4 (see 4.4), 
there was no strong statistically significant relationship found between any of the 
performance indicators of the companies and their respective BEE scores. The results 
highly aligned with the results of the inductive data analysis above. In the light of the 
extracted results from the regression tests, it is clear that the null hypothesis could not 
be rejected, and there was no correlation between BEE score and company 
performance in general. The results illustrated that the financial capabilities of a 
company cannot be judged by its BEE score, and companies that are more compliant 
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with the Codes do not get their desired returns. The deductive findings, however, 
showed the limitations of the approach, given that BEE guidelines in general are not 
solely focused on improving a company’s financial performance. The empirical 
analysis lacked consistency due to the use of ranked companies without probing deep 
into the industrial groups. 
5.4.2 Comparison of two data sets 
The analysis of the research findings collectively demonstrated that the null hypothesis 
for both the tests (regression and t-test) could not be rejected. Hence, the results 
postulated that BEE compliance does not produce desired results for the companies 
that can be translated into better profitability and market share. The results were 
significantly in favour of the null hypothesis. 
5.5 RESULTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF B-BBEE ACT, NO. 53 OF 
2003  
The results showed that the BEE guidelines and implementation have not been sound 
enough to achieve the objectives of the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003. Hence, each 
objective was assessed in the light of the results of the deductive analysis and a 
conclusion was made if those objectives have been achieved (section 2.4). 
Objective 1: 
Promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of 
black people in the economy (dti 2003a:4). 
The results of this study showed that, although the compliant companies were able to 
increase the participation of black people, the overall economic atmosphere lacked the 
transformation to make the participation meaningful. Meaningful participation would 
mean that the companies that inducted more black people were gaining increased 
returns and higher net profit margins. However, the t-test showed that the compliant 
companies were not accruing additional profits or an enhancement in the financial 
performance of the companies. Therefore, the BEE Commission failed to promote 
enabling environments for companies to use black people as lucrative assets to such 
an extent that their cost into the company’s atmosphere could be justified. This 
objective can, however, be said to be progressing to a point of being achieved since 
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there was an improvement in the BEE scores of the listed companies over the years 
since 2007. The increase in BEE scores were achieved because of black participation 
in these companies.  
Objective 2: 
Achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and 
management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new 
enterprises (dti 2003a:4). 
The second objective was achieved to some extent, given that a considerable number 
of companies had embraced BEE guidelines, and were willing to participate in the 
transformation. The companies were trying to adhere to the stipulated guidelines, given 
that they were encouraged by the potential benefits. However, the trend might not 
continue, given that the BEE Commission has not been able to fulfil their promises with 
regard to BEE initial strategy. 
Objectives 3 and 5: 
Increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other 
collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and 
increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training; and 
promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful 
participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable 
development and general prosperity (dti 2003a:4). 
The results of the t-test showed that black people who were inducted and who 
participate in the companies did not bring enough value to the company, which could 
be viewed as an indication that there could be a lack of sufficient skills and knowledge 
to bring financial value to these companies. On the other hand, a change was sensed 
from the adaptation of many companies of the BEE guidelines. Therefore, the B-BBEE 
strategy was effectively changing the participation dynamics of managerial and black 
people of many companies, but the results of the t-test showed that the change was 
not enough to create a level playing field for all companies, such that BEE-compliant 
companies may accrue expected profits from their better compliance. 
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Objectives 4, 6 and 7: 
Increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new 
enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and 
skills training; empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to 
economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills; and promoting 
access to finance for black economic empowerment (dti 2003a:4). 
For these three objectives, it would be difficult to measure success or failure using the 
data analysis from this study as the study used the overall BEE score without zooming 
in on the gender of those empowered, the rurality and locality of the communities 
empowered and the extent of finance of those empowered. Where the BEE scores of 
companies are improving over the years, it may very well mean that some of these 
objectives have been met, but the extent to which they were achieved needs to be 
measured. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The extrapolated information gave a significant insight into the influence of BEE 
compliance. It can be said that BEE-compliant companies trade their financial 
performance for BEE compliance. This inference can be based upon the premise that 
when a company complies with the standard protocols of the Codes, it has to spend a 
considerable amount on extending its social and moral influence by hiring more black 
people and training them in their early years. This leaves the profits of such company 
stunted for a certain period because of spending on transition phases. 
This phenomenon can be explained by the advantages a compliant company gets in 
terms of its better treatment from governmental agencies. It was established in the 
literature that, in addition to other advantages, BEE-compliant companies are 
especially favoured by government for tender placements and public–private 
partnerships. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the unsatisfactory performance of companies compliant 
with the Codes could be mainly due to the non-legal requirement for BEE compliance 
since it is rather a commercial incentive only. It is evident from the deductive results 
that companies with less BEE compliance are performing financially better than 
companies with more BEE compliance, based on the average mean of financial 
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performance measures used for the t-test. This is the result of a non-level playing field 
in which, due to BEE compliance, some companies have to invest more as a result of 
inducting and training black employees, socio-economic projects that benefit black 
people, and issuing shares at discounts to black participants while other get a free 
pass. Such imbalance resulted in weaker performance of compliant companies and 
they tend to lose the share of profits. The commercial incentive on the other hand 
seems to be much less than the setback to the compliant companies due to 
unbalanced economic field. 
Although significant relationships could not be established through regression analysis 
of the BEE scores and financial performance measures, this does not necessarily 
mean that BEE scores have no effect at all on the revenue and profits of a company. 
This is because there are many other factors that influence revenue and profitability of 
businesses. Another factor to take into consideration is that, whilst some companies 
are investing in BEE compliance, others are investing in marketing and research that 
could influence revenue and profitability significantly. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the B-BBEE Act, No. 53 of 2003 that was amended 
in 2013 made it compulsory for organs of state and public entities to apply, as opposed 
to taking into account, the Codes, when issuing licences, concessions or other 
authorisations, implementing preferential procurement policy, selling state-owned 
enterprises, partnering with the private sector and awarding incentives, grants and 
investment schemes. The expectation is that BEE will affect more companies and 
make it a necessity for them to comply with BEE legislation. What needs to be 
highlighted, however, is that the new Codes have become more stringent than the old 
Codes and therefore more costly than the old Codes. Therefore, it remains a possibility 
that the cost of compliance with the new Codes may outweigh the benefits government 
is attempting to implement. 
5.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS 
Even though the results of this study are not positive in terms of benefits that 
companies derive from the BEE compliance, companies should still view the 
improvement in BEE scores as good social responsibility, since empowerment of the 
disadvantaged communities of the society could benefit the whole country. 
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The results of similar studies to this one have a potential of discouraging companies 
to invest meaningfully in BEE. Government should, therefore, consider increasing the 
incentives for BEE compliance to ensure that the benefits would surpass the costs of 
compliance. 
Government should consider implementing penalties for companies that are not BEE-
compliant instead of making it an option. The main reason being that there are 
companies that do not have any dealings with government therefore they have a low 
appetite for BEE compliance because there is no direct benefit for them to be BEE-
compliant. This will level the playing fields since those that do not wish to comply would 
pay penalties that could be ploughed back into promotion of BEE. Finally, this would 
ensure that BEE affects all those who are in business regardless of the type or industry 
where the company is.  
Government policymakers need to ensure that all members of society understand how 
BEE benefits them to deal with the perception that it only benefits the elite and 
politically well-connected individuals. 
Government also needs to create a central database with BEE scores of all listed 
companies that is publically accessible to increase transparency relating to black 
empowerment. This will reveal the level of social responsibility of companies to 
stakeholders and customers. By making this information publically available, 
researchers could study the trends in BEE, and advise policymakers accordingly. 
The Minister of Trade and Industry should create a measurement tool that could track 
the success of the BEE policy implementation with clear key performance indicators 
and targets. This way government would be able to determine how far they need to 
accelerate the implementation of these policies. Success can only be established if 
there is a measure and timeline. 
Finally, unemployment in the country is still at alarming rates, poverty is still a factor, 
and economic growth is currently very low, even in comparison to other developing 
countries. These negative factors affect mainly the black population of this country and 
perhaps the government and policymakers need to think beyond BEE to address the 
economic challenges of the country. 
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5.8 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
An opportunity exists for a regression analysis of BEE scores per industry, because 
some industries probably need to be more BEE-compliant than others. For example, 
there is no real incentive for the retail industry to be BEE-compliant, since they sell 
directly to the public as opposed to industrial companies whose customers may require 
them to be BEE-compliant to improve their own BEE scores. 
BEE legislation has changed, with the main change being criminalisation of fronting 
and making BEE compliance more stringent. These changes will make BEE 
compliance costlier as the requirements have been increased. It would be an 
interesting study to see how these legislation changes affect the BEE scores and 
financial performance of companies. 
Most of the BEE studies focused on JSE-listed companies. The recommendation is 
that a study of unlisted companies be undertaken. This is because the financial 
performance challenges of unlisted companies may be completely different to the 
financial performance challenges of listed companies, since listed companies have 
more access to financial support and, because of their size, they may survive even if 
their revenue or profitability do not grow significantly. 
A study focusing on how BEE legislation and policy have changed or improved the 
economic lives of black people in general from both the business involvement and 
employment point of view is recommended.  
Investment in BEE compliance could be a long-term project to accommodate activities 
such as training black employees to equip them with the appropriate skills, grooming 
black management, issuing shares at a discount and maintaining black interest to 
ensure that the company benefits for a longer period. 
A study, which tracks the financial performance of companies over a period of five 
years or longer would be beneficial as some of the benefits of BEE investment may 
only be realised in later years as opposed to a year or two succeeding the investment 
in BEE compliance. 
A few studies (Ferreira & De Villiers 2011; Van der Merwe & Ferreira 2014) found that 
there is a negative relationship between financial performance and level of BEE 
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compliance. A study focusing on cost versus benefits of BEE compliance would assist 
in gathering knowledge on this subject. 
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ANNEXTURE A 
LIST OF COMPANIES USED IN THE STUDY 
ABE Construction Chemicals Ltd Avusa Ltd 
Accelerate Property Fund Ltd Awethu Breweries Ltd 
Acucap Properties Ltd Barloworld Ltd 
Adaptit Holdings Ltd Barnard Jacobs Mellet Holdings Ltd 
Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd Basil Read Holdings Ltd 
Adcorp Holdings Ltd Bauba Platinum Ltd 
Adrenna Property Group Ltd Beige Holdings Ltd 
Advtech Ltd Blue Label Telecoms Ltd 
AECI Ltd Bonatla Property Holdings Ltd 
Afgri Ltd Bowler Metcalf Ltd 
African & Overseas Enterprises Ltd Brikor Ltd 
African Bank Investments Ltd Brimstone Investment Corporation Ltd 
African Brick Centre Ltd Buildmax Ltd 
African Equity Empowerment Ltd Business Connexion Group Ltd 
African Media Entertainment Ltd Cadiz Holdings Ltd 
African Oxygen Ltd Cape Empowerment Ltd 
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd Capital Property Fund Ltd 
Afrimat Ltd Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd 
Afrocentric Investment Corporation Ltd Cargo Carriers Ltd 
AG Industries Ltd Cashbuild Ltd 
Ah-Vest Ltd Caxton And Ctp Publishers Ltd 
Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd Ceramic Industries Ltd 
Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd Cipla Medpro South Africa Ltd 
Amalgamated Electronic Corporation 
Ltd 
City Lodge Hotels Ltd 
Andulela Investment Holdings Ltd Clicks Group Ltd 
Anglo American Platinum Ltd Clientele Ltd 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd Clover Industries Ltd 
ARB Holdings Ltd Cognition Holdings Ltd 
Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd Comair Ltd 
Argent Industrial Ltd Combined Motor Holdings Ltd 
Arrowhead Properties Ltd Command Holdings Ltd 
Ascendis Health Ltd Compu-Clearing Outsourcing Ltd 
Ascension Properties Ltd Conduit Capital Ltd 
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd Consolidated Infrastructure Group Ltd 
Assore Ltd Control Instruments Group Ltd 
Astral Foods Ltd Coronation Fund Managers Ltd 
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Astrapak Ltd Country Bird Holdings Ltd 
Attacq Ltd Crookes Brothers Ltd 
Aveng Ltd Cullinan Holdings Ltd 
AVI Ltd Curro Holdings Ltd 
Datacentrix Holdings Ltd Holdsport Ltd 
Datatec Ltd Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd 
Delta EMD Ltd Hospitality Property Fund Ltd 
Delta Property Fund Ltd Howden Africa Holdings Ltd 
Dialogue Group Holdings Ltd Hudaco Industries Ltd 
Digicore Holdings Ltd Hulamin Ltd 
Dipula Income Fund Ltd Hyprop Investments Ltd 
Discovery Ltd IFA Hotels & Resorts Ltd 
Distell Group Ltd Iliad Africa Ltd 
Distribution And Warehousing Ltd Illovo Sugar Ltd 
Don Group Ltd (The) Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 
Dorbyl Ltd Imperial Holdings Ltd 
Drdgold Ltd Infrasors Holdings Ltd 
Ecsponent Ltd Ingenuity Property Investments Ltd 
Efficient Group Ltd Insimbi Refractory And Alloy Ltd 
ELB Group Ltd Intertrading Ltd 
Ellies Holdings Ltd Investec Property Group 
ENX Group Ltd Invicta Holdings Ltd 
EOH Holdings Ltd ISA Holdings Ltd 
Eqstra Holdings Ltd Italtile Ltd 
Esor Ltd Jasco Electronics Holdings Ltd 
Eureka Industrial Ltd JD Group Ltd 
Evraz Highveld Steel And Vanadi Ltd JSE Ltd 
Excellerate Holdings Ltd Kagiso Media Ltd 
Exxaro Resources Ltd Kairos Industrial Holdings Ltd 
Fairvest Property Holdings Ltd Kap Industrial Holdings Ltd 
Famous Brands Ltd Kaydav Group Ltd 
Finbond Group Ltd Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd 
Fortress Income Fund Ltd Kelly Group Ltd 
Foschini Group Ltd (The) Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 
Fountainhead Property Trust Ltd Labat Africa Ltd 
Freeworld Coatings Ltd. Lewis Group Ltd 
Gijima Group Ltd Liberty Holdings Ltd 
Gold Fields Ltd Litha Healthcare Group Ltd 
Grand Parade Investments Ltd M Cubed Holdings Ltd 
Grindrod Ltd Masonite (Africa) Ltd 
Group Five Ltd Massmart Holdings Ltd 
Growthpoint Properties Ltd Master Drilling Group Ltd 
Hardware Warehouse Ltd Mazor Group Ltd 
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Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd Mediclinic International Ltd 
Datacentrix Holdings Ltd Holdsport Ltd 
Datatec Ltd Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd 
Delta EMD Ltd Hospitality Property Fund Ltd 
Delta Property Fund Ltd Howden Africa Holdings Ltd 
Dialogue Group Holdings Ltd Hudaco Industries Ltd 
Digicore Holdings Ltd Hulamin Ltd 
Dipula Income Fund Ltd Hyprop Investments Ltd 
Discovery Ltd IFA Hotels & Resorts Ltd 
Distell Group Ltd Iliad Africa Ltd 
Distribution And Warehousing Ltd Illovo Sugar Ltd 
Don Group Ltd (The) Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 
Dorbyl Ltd Imperial Holdings Ltd 
Drdgold Ltd Infrasors Holdings Ltd 
Ecsponent Ltd Ingenuity Property Investments Ltd 
Efficient Group Ltd Insimbi Refractory And Alloy Ltd 
ELB Group Ltd Intertrading Ltd 
Ellies Holdings Ltd Investec Property Group 
ENX Group Ltd Invicta Holdings Ltd 
EOH Holdings Ltd ISA Holdings Ltd 
Eqstra Holdings Ltd Italtile Ltd 
Esor Ltd Jasco Electronics Holdings Ltd 
Eureka Industrial Ltd JD Group Ltd 
Evraz Highveld Steel And Vanadi Ltd JSE Ltd 
Excellerate Holdings Ltd Kagiso Media Ltd 
Exxaro Resources Ltd Kairos Industrial Holdings Ltd 
Fairvest Property Holdings Ltd Kap Industrial Holdings Ltd 
Famous Brands Ltd Kaydav Group Ltd 
Finbond Group Ltd Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd 
Fortress Income Fund Ltd Kelly Group Ltd 
Foschini Group Ltd (The) Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 
Fountainhead Property Trust Ltd Labat Africa Ltd 
Freeworld Coatings Ltd. Lewis Group Ltd 
Gijima Group Ltd Liberty Holdings Ltd 
Gold Fields Ltd Litha Healthcare Group Ltd 
Grand Parade Investments Ltd M Cubed Holdings Ltd 
Grindrod Ltd Masonite (Africa) Ltd 
Group Five Ltd Massmart Holdings Ltd 
Growthpoint Properties Ltd Master Drilling Group Ltd 
Hardware Warehouse Ltd Mazor Group Ltd 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd Mediclinic International Ltd 
Merafe Resources Ltd Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd 
Merchant & Industrial Properties Ltd Pick n Pay Stores Ltd 
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Metair Investments Ltd Pinnacle Holdings Ltd 
Metmar Ltd Pioneer Food Group Ltd 
Metorex Ltd PPC Ltd 
Metrofile Holdings Ltd Premium Properties Ltd 
Micromega Holdings Ltd Prescient Ltd 
Miranda Mineral Holdings Ltd Primeserv Group Ltd 
MIX Telematics Ltd Protech Khuthele Holdings Ltd 
Mmi Holdings Ltd PSG Group Ltd 
Mondi Ltd Purple Group Ltd 
Morvest Group Ltd Putprop Ltd 
Mpact Ltd Quantum Foods Holdings Ltd 
Mr Price Group Ltd Queensgate Hotels and Leisure Ltd 
MTN Group Ltd Racec Group Ltd 
Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Rand Merchant Insurance Holding Ltd 
Mustek Ltd Raubex Group Ltd 
Mvelaserve Ltd RCL Foods Ltd 
Nampak Ltd Rebosis Property Fund Ltd 
Naspers Ltd Redefine Properties International Ltd 
Netcare Ltd Remgro Ltd 
New Bond Capital Ltd Resilient Property Income Fund  
Nictus Ltd Reunert Ltd 
Niveus Investments Ltd Rex Trueform Clothing Company Ltd 
Northam Platinum Ltd Rhodes Food Group Holdings Ltd 
Nu-World Holdings Ltd Rolfes Holdings Ltd 
Oceana Group Ltd Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd 
Octodec Investments Ltd SA French Ltd 
O-Line Holdings Ltd SA Corporate Real Estate Fund 
Omnia Holdings Ltd Sallies Ltd 
Onelogix Group Ltd Sanlam Ltd 
Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd Santam Ltd 
Orion Real Estate Ltd Santova Ltd 
Palabora Mining Company Ltd Sanyati Holdings Ltd 
Paladin Capital Ltd Sappi Ltd 
Pangbourne Properties Ltd Sasol Ltd 
Paracon Holdings Ltd Sea Kay Holdings Ltd 
Peregrine Holdings Ltd Securedata Holdings Ltd 
Petmin Ltd Sentula Mining Ltd 
Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd Sephaku Holdings Ltd 
Set Point Group Ltd Trans Hex Group Ltd 
Shoprite Holdings Ltd Transaction Capital Ltd 
Sibanye Gold Ltd Transpaco Ltd 
South African Coal Mining Holdings 
Ltd 
Trematon Capital Investments Ltd 
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South Ocean Holdings Ltd Trencor Ltd 
Sovereign Food Investments Ltd Truworths International Ltd 
Spanjaard Ltd Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd 
Spescom Ltd TWP Holdings Ltd 
Spur Corporation Ltd UCS Group Ltd 
Stefanutti Stocks Holdings Ltd Universal Industries Corporation Ltd 
Steinhoff International Holding Ltd Value Group Ltd 
Stella Vista Technologies Ltd Verimark Holdings Ltd 
Stellar Capital Partners Ltd Village Main Reef Ltd 
Sun International Ltd Vividend Income Fund Ltd 
Super Group Ltd Vodacom Group Ltd 
Sycom Property Fund Ltd Vox Telecom Ltd 
Synergy Income Fund Ltd Vukile Property Fund Ltd 
Taste Holdings Ltd Vunani Ltd 
Telkom Sa Soc Ltd Wescoal Holdings Ltd 
Texton Property Fund Ltd Wilson Bayly Holmes - Ovcon Ltd 
Thabex Ltd Winhold Ltd 
The Bidvest Group Ltd Woolworths Holdings Ltd 
The Spar Group Ltd Workforce Holdings Ltd 
Tiger Brands Ltd York Timber Holdings Ltd 
Times Media Group Ltd Zaptronix Ltd 
Tongaat Hulett Ltd Zeder Investments Ltd 
Tower Property Fund Ltd Zurich Insurance Company South Ltd 
Tradehold Ltd 
 
 
